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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
PAUL C. ALLEN,
Petitioner/Appellant,
Case No. 20070254-SC
v.
CLINT FRIEL, STATE OF UTAH, et al.,
Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner appeals from the denial ofhis petition for post-conviction relief challenging
his conviction for aggravated murder, a capital offense. This Court has jurisdiction of this
appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, PRESERVATION,
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Whether the Court should summarily dismiss petitioner's appeal, where he fails
to either acknowledge or challenge the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition?
Standard of Review: "It is well established that a reviewing court will not address
arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Thomas,96\ P.2d 299,304 (Utah 1998).

2.

Whether the post-conviction court correctly concluded that all but one of

petitioner's claims were procedurally barred and that his remaining claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel was too vague and speculative to satisfy his burden of proof?
Standard of Review: '"We review an appeal from an order dismissing or denying a
petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower court's
conclusions of law.'" Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, \ 7, 94 P.3d 263 (quoting Rudolph
v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7, f 4, 43 P.3d 467).
STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A:
§ 78-2-2 (West 2004);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3 (West 2004);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-35a-105 and -106 (West 2004);
Utah R. App. P. 3, 11, 23B, and 24;
Utah R. Evid. 606;
UTAH CODE ANN.

UtahR. Crim. P. 17.
CASE AND FACT STATEMENT
The Criminal Case
On the evening of August 28,1996, police discovered the lifeless body of petitioner's
wife, Jill Allen, in their North Salt Lake City apartment. State v. Allen,20Q5\JT

11^3,108

P.3d. 730 (Addendum B). Blood spattered the surrounding walls and soaked the carpet
beneath her half-naked body. Id. at lfif3-4. A baseball bat lay nearby. Id. atf 3. Although
there were signs that there had been a struggle, there was no evidence of a forced entry. Id.

2

at <f| 4. A forensic pathologist determined that death was caused by strangulation and blunt
force trauma to the head and that there was no evidence of sexual assault. Id.
Months after the police had unsuccessfully pursued leads, Brandon Nicholsen came
forward. Id. at f 5. He informed the lead investigator that he had assisted a coworker,
George Anthony Taylor, to dispose of evidence of the murder of a woman in North Salt
Lake. Id. In exchange for immunity, Nicholsen told police that three weeks before the
murder, Taylor told him that Taylor and a Joseph Wright had been hired by a "Paul" to kill
Paul's wife, for which Taylor would receive between $5,000 and $10,000 for his
participation. Id.
Later, Taylor admitted the killing to Nicholsen, explaining that when the gun he intended to
use misfired, he beat Jill with a bat and then strangled her to death. Id.
Taylor and Wright confessed to their parts in the murder. Id. at ^fij 7-8. Wright told
police that petitioner approached him in 1995 and indicated that he, petitioner, knew a
coworker who would pay to have "a guy" killed. Id. at «f 8. Later, after Wright had shown
some interest, petitioner said it was he who wanted his wife killed. Id. Petitioner offered
to pay Wright $30,000 from Jill's life insurance policy to kill her. Id. In April 1996, after
discussing various plans, Wright agreed to the offer. Id.
According to Wright, petitioner paid him between $14,000 and $16,000 before and
after the murder, promising the balance when petitioner received the proceeds of the
insurance policy. Id. at f 9.

3

Following the police investigation, the State charged petitioner with aggravated
murder, conspiracy to commit aggravated murder, and criminal solicitation in connection
with the murder. Id. at^JlO.
At trial, petitioner was represented by Ronald Yengich and Bradley Rich. R256.
Following a three-week trial in February 2000, a jury convicted petitioner of aggravated
murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life with the possibility of parole. Allen, 2005
UTll,1f 10;R12.
After trial, trial counsel and petitioner had a conference in which counsel and
petitioner purportedly discussed

possible claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

petitioner might raise. R559, \ 7. That conference was transcribed and the transcript was
sealed. Id.
Petitioner moved for a new trial alleging that a juror had learned from her husband
that defense counsel had requested a mistrial and that the juror had later relayed that
information to the jury. Allen, 2005 UT 11, ^ 47. The trial court denied the motion,
concluding that although the juror's conduct was inappropriate, defendant had not been
prejudiced, because the juror's impropriety was "innocuous" and because the jury did not
discuss the mistrial issue. Id. at ^ 48.
On direct appeal, petitioner was represented by Scott Wiggins. Id. Petitioner claimed
that the trial court abused its discretion in (1) permitting the prosecution to introduce
evidence under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, that petitioner had made fraudulent
credit card purchases; (2) refusing to grant a mistrial after Wright testified that pel itioner had
4

been asked by the police to take a lie detector test; and (3) refusing to grant a new trial based
on juror misconduct. Id. at \ 11. This Court rejected all of those claims on the merits and
affirmed petitioner's conviction. Id. at Xi U 12-57. The Court also refused to consider,
based on inadequate briefing, petitioner's claims that (1) the trial ututl erred in denying a
motion for a mistrial based on a witness's brief mention that petitioner had retained an
attorney; (2) the reasonable doubt instruction was incorrect; and (3) petitioner was prejudiced
by cumulative error. Id. n.2. Petitioner did not claim that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction for aggravated in
The United States Supreme Court denied petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari on
October 3,2005, see Allen v. Utah, 126 S. Ct. 60 (2005), and denied rehearing on December
12, 2005. See Allen v. Utah, 126 S. Ct. 823 (2005).
The 1 Petition for Post-conviction Relie I
Petitioner, pro se, timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief on October 18,
2005, R29-196. The petition alleged five broad claims for relief. R43-83. On review of the
petition, the post-conviction court noted that the petition contained several additional distinct
claims. See Order Requiring Responsive Pleading from the <*:\\e of Utah ("Order for
Response"), R201-04, at 201 (Addendum C). Thus, "for the sake of clarity, the court. . .
renumbered all of the claims raised in the petition as follows: [1]; Judicial Bias; [2]
Prosecution's use of false testimony during trial; [3] Jurors were not fair and impartial; [4]
Trial court's refusal to give Petitioner's proffered jury instructions; [5] Erroneous jury
instructions and special verdict form; [6] Error in trying Petitioner for multiple offenses; [7]
5

The Utah Supreme Court's decision on Petitioner's direct appeal was result-driven and
erroneous; [8] Error by the trial court resulting in a trial that was fundamentally unfair; [9]
Error by the trial court in denying Petitioner's motion for a new trial; [10] Ineffective
assistance of trial counsel; and [11] Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel." R201-02.
The post-conviction court dismissed claims 7 and 9 and ordered the State to respond
to all the other claims identified by the court. See Order for Response, R202-03.
After the State was ordered to respond, Scott Daniels appeared for petitioner. R219.
Thereafter, the parties agreed in open court that Mr. Daniels should be permitted to withdraw
as counsel and instead act in an advisory capacity only and that defendant would represent
himself. R385, 393, 394-95, 397-401, 418, 423-24.
The State filed a motion to dismiss the petition. See Motion to Dismiss Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief and Supporting Memorandum ("Motion to Dismiss"), R238-61.
Tracking the enumeration of claims applied to the petition by the court, the State first noted
that the court had dismissed claim numbers 7 and 9. R245. The State then argued that all
but one of petitioner's undismissed claims were procedurally barred. R246-49. As to the
remaining claim—that appellate counsel was ineffective (claim 11)—the State argued that
the claim was too vague to merit consideration and, to the extent the claim could be
understood, it failed on its merits. R257-60. At the same time, the State also moved to strike
the affidavit ofjuror Trenton David, which appeared to partly form the basis of claims 3 and
8. R58, 78-81, 192-93,230-32.
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Petitioner moved for judgment on the pleadings. R373-75. He also responded to the
State's motion to dismiss, arguing that under federal law there is no procedural default where
there is failure to raise a claim of ineffective assistance on direct appeal. R3 52-60.
The State replied, arguing that not only was fedc - -aw irrelevant to the discussioi 1
of state procedural bar, but that petitioner was mistaken even if federal policy did apply to
Utah law. R. 441-47. The State also rebutted conceivable grounds of ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel stemming from on petitioner's vague allegations. R447-62.
Petitioner replied, expanding the arguments he had i nade in the petition and in his
response to the motion to dismiss. R478-539.
On January 24, 2007, the post-conviction court heard arguments on all pending
motions and took the matter under advisement. R557. Petitioner appeared for himself, pro
se, and Mr. Daniels sat at counsel table with petitioner, acting in an advisory capacity. /</
On March 14, 2007, the court dismissed the petition. Order Dismissing Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief ("Order of Dismissal"), R557-560 (Addendum D). The court ruled
that all of petitioner's undismissed claims, with the exception of a claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel, were procedurally

/

iv558, ^j 3. As to the claim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, it ruled that petitioner's claims were "too vague
and speculative" to satisfy his burden of proof. R558-59, f 5.

The court also denied

petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted the State's motion to strike the
affidavit of juror Trenton David R560, Yl 2 & 3.
Defendant timely appealed. R565.
7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The Court should summarily dismiss this appeal. Although Utah's appellate courts
tend to accord pro se litigants some leniency, those litigants must still follow the appellate
rules. Petitioner in this case has blatantly disregarded those rules.
Petitioner purports to appeal the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition.
However, petitioner's brief is nothing more than his petition behind an appellate brief cover.
Consequently, petitioner on appeal neither mentions the existence of the court's order of
dismissal nor challenges any of the court's conclusions for dismissing the petition. The Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure expressly provide that an appellant may "appeal" a final order
of the trial court. Presented simply as a post-conviction petition, however, petitioner's appeal
essentially dictates that this Court examine his petition de novo, in contravention of this
Court's statutorily authorized appellate function. Those rules also require that an appellant
provide the "contentions and reasons" relevant to the issues on appeal. Here, petitioner has
flouted the appellate rules by failing to even challenge the post-conviction court's order.
Additionally, petitioner has not brought up the record in the criminal case, which is
necessary to assess his claims of error. He has not brought up the transcript of the hearing
in which the court heard argument on the petition. And he has not adequately briefed or
supported with a pertinent record the only issue not ruled procedurally barred. That issue
involves a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. After trial, trial counsel and petitioner
had a conference in which counsel and petitioner purportedly discussed possible claims of
8

ineffective assistance of counsel that petitioner might raise in the future. Although that
conference was transcribed, petitioner never moved to unseal it in the post-conviction
proceedings and has not made it part of the record on appeal. Accordingly; this Court should
summarily dismiss petitioner's appeal as inadequately briefed and affirm, without further
review, the post-conviction court's order dismissing the petition.
POINT II
Should this Court excuse petitioner's deficiencies, the post-conviction court correctly
dismissed, the petition. Soon after the petition was filed, the court determined that although
petitioner had raised five numbered claims, the petition actually included additional
unnumbered claims. The court renumbered petitioner's claims, listing and specifically
identifying a total of eleven. The court ruled that two of the claims were frivolous, a
conclusion that petitioner does not dispute.
After reviewing the State's motion to dismiss the petition and all subsequently-filed
pleadings of the parties, the court ruled that all but one of the remaining nine claims could
have been raised at trial or on appeal, but were not. Accordingly, the court ruled that, under
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, those claims were procedural 1\ barred, Petitioner has
made no persuasive argument to rebut that conclusion.
Petitioner's sole remaining claim was that appellate counsel was ineffective for not
raising trial counsels' ineffectiveness in stipulating, in petitioner's absence, that the testimony
of two prosecution witnesses not be given to the jury. The court essentially ruled that any
objection petitioner might have made to withholding the testimony would have been futile.
9

Contrary to petitioner's claim, a criminal defendant is not entitled to input when a trial court
communicates with the jury on a point of law. And even if the trial court acted improperly,
petitioner was not prejudiced because the testimony would almost certainly have been
withheld based on the prosecutors' objection.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT SHOULD SUMMARILY DISMISS PETITIONER'S
APPEAL, WHICH FAILS TO EITHER ACKNOWLEDGE OR
CHALLENGE THE POST-CONVICTION COURT'S DISMISSAL OF
THE PETITION
"As a general rule, a party who represents himself will be held to the same standard
of knowledge and practice as any qualified member of the bar [.]" Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669
P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983). "At the same time, .. . 'because of [their] lack of technical
knowledge of law and procedure [, pro se appellants] should be accorded every consideration
that may reasonably be indulged.'" Id. (quoting Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266, 372
P.2d 990,991 (1962)). Nevertheless, even though appellate courts are "generally... lenient
with pro se litigants," those litigants must still follow the appellate rules. Lundahl v. Quinn,
2003 UT 11,1(4, 67 P.3d 1000.
"It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not
adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998).
Here, because petitioner has singularly disregarded the appellate rules, his brief is
inadequate. Most importantly, petitioner has failed not only to challenge the post-conviction

10

court's conclusions for dismissing his petition, but also to even acknowledge the existence
of the order of dismissal.
An appeal is a "[r]esort to a superior (/. e. appellate) court to review the decision of an
inferior (i.e. trial) court

" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 88 (5th ed. 1979). See also Utah

R. App. P. 3(a)("An appeal may be taken from a district... court to the appellate court...
from all final orders . . . ."); Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(9) ("The argument shall contain the
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented

") Further, "rtlhe

addendum shall contain a copy of:... those parts of the record that are of central imporiu i
to the determination of the appeal, such as . . . conclusions of law . . . ." Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(l 1)(C). In light of what constitutes an appeal and in the circumstances of this case,
rule 24 requires that appellant's "contentions and reasons" be directed in the first instance
to the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition, not to the alleged actions of the trial
court or of the judiciary generally. See Aplt. Br.
Here, petitioner's brief is essentially a verbatim copy of his petition. Petitioner has
not acknowledged the post-conviction court's order of dismissal (R5 5 7-60, at Addendum D),
merely mentioning instead that the coi irt am io\ n iced its rulings in a telephone conference.
Aplt. Br. at 3. Nowhere does petitioner refer to the order of dismissal or challenge any of the
post-conviction court's conclusions. Aplt. Br. at 4-44. None of the addenda contain a copy
of the order of dismissal. Aplt. Br. at Addenda A-I.

By his omissions, petitioner has

completely disregarded the very concept of an appeal and contravened the Rules of Appellate
Procedure. By filing such a brief, petitioner essentially directs this Court to abdicate its
11

function as an appellate court and to examine his claims de novo, as though it were a trial
court.1
This Court is not authorized to function as petitioner presumes to dictate. "The
Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction . . . over... orders . . . of any court of record over
which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-2-2(i) (West 2004) (emphasis added). Because petitioner was charged with and
convicted of a capital felony, see Allen, 2005 UT 11, ^f 10, the court of appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction over this case. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (West
2004) ("The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction . . . over... appeals from any court
of record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a . . . capital felony.") Thus,
while this Court has formal appellate jurisdiction, petitioner's brief dictates that this Court
review his claims outside its statutorily-authorized appellate role. Because petitioner has
1

The only differences between the brief and the petition are a minor change in
form of a single page, typographical alterations in the table of contents, inclusion of an
omitted phrase, and minor rearrangements of the same material in two addenda.
Specifically, the differences are: (1) the rendering in question form in the brief of topics
identified in the petition {compare Aplt. Br. at 2 with R30); (2) inclusion of an expanded
jurisdictional statement in the brief {compare Aplt. Br. at 1 with R40); (3) substitution of
Roman numerals for ordinal numbers in the Table of Contents {compare Aplt. Br. at i-x
with R (R30-39); (4) a line spacing change beginning at page 30 of the brief pages and
again at page 42 {compare Aplt. Br. at 30-44 with R69-81); (5) the addition in the brief of
an enumerated phrase apparently omitted from the petition—"(4) [t]here are substantial
allegations of newly discovered evidence" {compare Aplt. Br. at 42 with R81); and (6) the
rearrangement of pages and exhibits in two addenda to the brief and the petition {compare
Aplt. Br. at Addendum F, including pp. 11-13 of "Corrections in Utah Holding Hostage
of an Entire State"; and Addendum H, exhibiting copy of new trial motion and affidavits
of petitioner and Gary Potter with Addendum F of petition, Rl 76-77, exhibiting copy of
new trial motion and affidavits of petitioner and Gary Potter, and Addendum H at 188-90,
including pp. 11-13 of "Corrections in Utah Holding Hostage of an Entire State").
12

disregarded the appellate rules and this Court's proper authority, the Court should summarily
dismiss the appeal as inadequately briefed.
Petitioner's failure to challenge the post-conviction courI s order of dismissal also
provides an additional legal basis for summarily dismissing this appeal: Failure to challenge
a trial court's ruling on appeal establishes the court's ruling as the law of the case, precluding
further judicial review of the matter. State v. Rodriguez, 841 P.2d 1228,1229 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) (citing Tracy v. University of Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 340, 341 ( I Jtaii 1980) ("Where
. . . any other final ruling or oi der of the trial court goes unchallenged by appeal, such
becomes the law of the case, and is not thereafter subject to later challenge.")).
Petitioner has also disregarded the appellate rules in other significant ways. An
appellant has a duty to ensure the assembling of the record, including transcripts, necessary
to the resolution of claims on appeal See Utah I X \ pp I) 1 l(c -) (requiring that appellant
comply with subsections (d) and (e) to enable clerk to assemble the record); Utah R. App.
P. 11(d)(2) (requiring clerk to include all papers in the civil case); Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2)
(requiring appellant to include in the record all transcripts relevant to a challenged finding
or conclusion). Petitioner's brief and his pleadings below rely on the criminal record,
particularly with respect to claims 2, 4-6, and 8-11. Aplt. Br. at 22, 14-25, 39-41, 43-44;
Petition, R50, 53-64, 78-80, 82-83.2 However, petitioner did not make the record in the
2

To aid the Court in reviewing this case, the State has identified the claims the
post-conviction court enumerated with those pages of the petition (and, consequently,
petitioner's brief on appeal) on which those claims are apparently addressed. The
following list (formalized as separate document at Addendum E) sets out the page of the
petition, with its record number in parenthesis, followed by the corresponding page of
13

criminal case part of the record in the post-conviction proceedings. Consequently, none of
the references in petitioner's brief or documents in addenda that were part of the criminal
record are properly before this Court. Moreover, without the record of the criminal
proceedings this Court cannot properly place petitioner's post-conviction claims in context.
Finally, petitioner has failed to adequately brief his claim of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel, the only claim that was neither previously dismissed nor procedurally
barred and by which petitioner might have legitimately addressed his other claims. See Order
to Respond, R201-03 at 202 (Addendum C); and Order of Dismissal, R557-60 at 558, f 5
(Addendum D). As discussed more fully at Point IIC, below, not only is that claim vague
and speculative, it does not even discuss the test or cite to any authority by which ineffective
assistance is measured. SeeStatev. Thomas, 1999 UT 2,^11,974 P.2d 269 ('" [A] reviewing
court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not
simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research.'") (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)). Moreover, as the

appellant's brief: (1) Judicial Bias — 15-19 (R43-47, 50-53, 73-78); 4-8, 11-14, 34-39;
(2) Prosecution's use of false testimony during trial — 20-22, 25-30 (R48-50, 53-58); 911, 14-19; (3) Jurors were not fair and impartial — 30, 51-52 (R58, 79-80); 19, 40-41; (4)
Trial court's refusal to give petitioner's proffered jury instructions — 31, 53 (R 59, 81);
20, 42; (5) Erroneous jury instructions and special verdict form — 32-33, 36, 53 (R60-61,
64, 81); 21-22, 25, 42; (6) Error in trying Petitioner for multiple offenses — 34-35, 37-41
(R62-63, 65-69); 23-24, 26-30; (7) The Utah Supreme Court's decision on petitioner's
direct appeal was result-driven and erroneous — 41-45 (R69-73); 30-34; (8) Error by the
trial court resulting in a trial that was fundamentally unfair — 50-55 (R78-83); 39-44; (9)
Error by the trial court in denying Petitioner's motion for a new trial — 50 (R78); 39; (10)
Ineffective assistance of trial counsel — 54-55 (R82-83); 43-44; and (11) Ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel — 54-55 (R82-83); 43-44.
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post-conviction court noted, petitioner did not even request a review of the sealed transcript
of a conference petitioner had with his trial counsel, Ron Yengich, in which they purportedly
discussed possible claims of Mr. Yengich's ineffective assistance. R559, f 7. Given the
significance of petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance to the survival of his claims
generally, petitioner's failure to include this transcript is yet another significant breach of the
appellate rules. Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2).
In sum, and even recognizing the leniency appellate courts generally accord to pro se
litigants, petitioner's disregard of the conceptual basis of an appeal and the appellate rules
is sufficiently egregious that the appeal should be summarily dismissed. In any event, the
post-conviction court correctly dismissed the petition.
POINT II
THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT ALL BUT ONE OF PETITIONER'S CLAIMS WERE
PROCEDURALLY BARRED AND THAT HIS REMAINING CLAIM
OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS
TOO VAGUE AND SPECULATIVE TO SATISFY HIS BURDEN OF
PROOF
Petitioner has not challenged the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition.
Therefore, as discussed at Point I, his appeal should be summarily dismissed. In any case,
the post-conviction court's ruling was correct.
"'We review an appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition for
post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower court's conclusions of
law.'" Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, «| 7,94 P.3d 263 (quotingRudolph v. Galetka, 2002
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UT 7, f 4, 43 P.3d 467). "Further, 'we survey the record in the light most favorable to the
findings and judgment; and we will not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to
support the trial court's refusal to be convinced that the writ should be granted.'" Myers v.
State, 2004 UT 31, f 9, 94 P.3d 211 (quoting Medina v. Cook, 779 P.2d 658, 658 (Utah
1989) (quotation omitted)).
A. Almost all of petitioner's claims are procedurally barred because
they could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal, but were not.
The record shows that petitioner failed to carry his burden in the post-conviction
proceedings, and that the court's conclusions dismissing the petition were correct.
Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), the burden is on petitioner to show
that he is entitled to relief by a preponderance of the evidence. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 783 5a-105 (West 2004).3 Section 78-35a-105 also imposes on a petitioner the same burden to
disprove "any ground of preclusion"—a responsive claim of procedural bar—if that ground
is pled by the respondent.
This Court has repeatedly applied procedural bar under the PCRA: "Post-conviction
relief is a collateral attack on a conviction or sentence; it is not a substitute for appellate
review." State v. Taylor, 2007 UT 12, f 14, 156 P.3d 739 (citing Carter v. Galetka, 2001
3

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-35a-105 (West 2004) provides:

The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a
preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to
relief. The respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion
under Section 78-3 5a-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner
has the burden to disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.
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UT 96, f 6, 44 P.3d 626 {Carter III)), cert denied, 525 U.S. 833 (2007). "A defendant is
not eligible for post-conviction relief on any ground that was raised on appeal or that could
have been raised on appeal." Id. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106 (2002)).4 Accord
Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42,ffif8-13,19, 94 P.3d 263 (challenged jury instruction was
not raised at trial, on direct appeal, or in prior post-conviction proceeding); Carter III, 2001
UT 96,ffl[14-15 (multiple claims that could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not,
were procedurally barred). "Thus, on an appeal from a post-conviction order, this [C]ourt
will only address the merits of claims that could not have been raised prior to the
4

Section 78-35a-106 has not been amended since it was enacted in 1996. See UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006). The section provides as follows:
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground
that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction
relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for
post-conviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on
a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on
appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of
counsel.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-35a-106 (2004).
17

post-conviction proceeding below . . . ." Id. (citing Carter III, 2001 UT 96, f 17).
Nevertheless, although "[a] petitioner is 'procedurally barred' from relief under the PCRA
if an issue 'could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal,' [a ground for relief may
be raised if] the petitioner can demonstrate that 'the failure to raise that ground was due to
ineffective assistance of counsel.'" State v. Benvenuto, 2007 UT 53, ^ 16,

P.3d

(quoting subsections 78-35a-106(l)(c) and (2)).5
As enumerated by the post-conviction court, the petition raised eleven claims under
which petitioner sought relief. See Order for Response, R201 -03, at 201 -02 (Addendum C).
Directly after the petition was filed, the court dismissed claims 7 and 9 as frivolous.
Petitioner has not challenged that conclusion. Using the court's enumeration of claims, the
State moved to dismiss almost all of petitioner's remaining claims because they were
procedurally barred under section 78-35a-106(b) and (c); that is, the State argued that those
claims should be dismissed because they were raised or could have been raised on direct
appeal. R245-49. The post-conviction court reviewed the petition and the parties' motions
and memoranda and found that of the eleven claims asserted in the petition, eight were
procedurally barred under section 78-35a-106:

5

Alternatively, this Court may reach an issue under the "unusual circumstances"
exception to the procedural bar rule: "Under the unusual circumstances test, we will
address claims that are procedurally barred if the petitioner can show 'that there was an
obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right.'" Taylor,
2007 UT 12, If 15, (quoting Carter III, 2001 UT 96, ^ 15). Petitioner has not requested
that the Court examine his claims under the unusual circumstances exception. In any
event, petitioner's claims do not suggest the applicability of that exception. Aplt. Br. at 444.
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Almost all ofpetitioner's claims are procedurally barred. In his petition,
petitioner alleged prosecutorial misconduct [claim 2], juror misconduct [claim
3], improper jury instruction [claims 4 and 5], merger [claim 6], structural
error [claims 1 and 8] and ineffective assistance of counsel [claim 10]. All of
these claims, with the exception of claims of ineffective assistance against
petitioner's appellate attorneys, are barred because petitioner is not entitled to
relief on any ground that was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal, or that
could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal. Utah Code Ann. §
78-35a-106(b) & (c) (West 2004).
(emphasis added); Order of Dismissal, R557-60, at 558, \ 3 (Addendum D).
As noted, petitioner has not challenged the post-conviction court's dismissal of the
aforementioned eight claims based on procedural bar. Aple. Br. at Pt. I. On that basis alone,
his appeal fails. Id. Moreover, the court's conclusion that the eight specific claims it
referenced were procedurally barred is correct. Those claims could have been raised at trial
or on direct appeal, but were not. See Order of Dismissal at R558, ^f 3 (citing section
78-35a-106(b) & c). Thus, the court's order dismissing those claims stands, and this Court
need not consider the merits of those claims. See Taylor, 2007 UT 12, ^f 14 (refusing to
consider merits of challenges to trial court's decisions or constitutionality of death penalty
as procedurally barred because they could have been, but were not, raised on direct appeal).
Petitioner challenges only that part of the court's order dismissing his claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.6 Petitioner argues that the United States Supreme

6

Petitioner does not specify whether his challenge concerns procedural bar as to
an ineffective-assistance claim directed toward either or both his trial or appellate
counsel. Aplt. Br. at 43. However, as the post-conviction court specifically ruled that
petitioner's ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim was not procedurally barred,
see Order of Dismissal, R5 57-60, at 558, \ 3, only an argument that an ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim cannot be procedurally barred is relevant to this appeal.
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Court, in United States v. Massaro, 538 U.S. 500 (2003), agreed with ten federal courts of
appeal that "there is no procedural default for failure to raise and ineffective assistance claim
on direct appeal." Aplt. Br. at 43. Massaro is inapposite to this appeal.
Massaro was convicted in a federal district court of murder in aid of racketeering.
Massaro, 538 U.S. at 502. On direct appeal, his new counsel failed to argue ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, who had declined the trial court's offer of a mid-trial continuance
to prepare for evidence that the government withheld until after trial had begun. Id. Massaro
moved to vacate his conviction under 18 U.S. C. § 2255 (federal post-conviction proceeding),
arguing the over-looked ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Id. The district court found
this claim barred because Massaro could have raised it on direct appeal. Id. The United
States Supreme Court held that failure to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on
direct appeal does not bar claim from being brought in later, appropriate collateral
proceeding. Id. at 504. The Court noted that the district court in collateral proceedings was
"the forum best suited to developing the facts necessary to determining the adequacy of
representation during an entire trial"— a place where the court could "take evidence from
witnesses and counsel alleged to have rendered the deficient performance^]" and the parties
may develop a record "bearing precisely on t h e . . . issue." Id. at 505-06 (citations omitted).
Petitioner seizes on Massaro's holding to argue that his ineffective-assistance-of counsel claim is not procedurally barred. However, Massaro, is plainly inapplicable to
petitioner's appeal. First, the Massaro, holding is directed to federal courts applying federal
statutes, not to state courts rules applying state statutes. Second, the rationale behind the
20

Massaro holding is that a petitioner must be allowed to make a record pertinent to an
ineffective- assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in federal habeas proceedings because there is
no such opportunity to do so in the federal criminal proceeding. As discussed below, that
impediment to making a record in state criminal proceedings in Utah has been removed with
the adoption of rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
As noted, section 78-35a-106 provides that "[notwithstanding [that a claim is
procedurally barred because it could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal], a
person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been but was not
raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance
of counsel." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106(2) (2004). Where, as in this case, a petitioner
is represented by different counsel on appeal than at trial, this provision necessarily limits a
claim of ineffective assistance to appellate counsel and excludes a direct claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.
Before 1992, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were exempt from the
rule that a defendant must raise, on direct appeal, all of the errors that allegedly occurred at
his trial. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ffif 12-13, 12 P.3d 92. The exception was
necessary for two reasons. First, defendants were often represented on appeal by the same
counsel who assisted them at trial. Id. Second, even when a defendant had different counsel
on appeal, the record was often inadequate to adjudicate ineffectiveness claims because most
ineffectiveness occurred outside the record. Id. Therefore, defendants were sometimes
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allowed to raise ineffectiveness claims for the first time in post-conviction proceedings,
rather than on direct appeal. See id
In 1992, however, rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, was adopted. Id. at
fflj 14-17. Rule 23B negated the need to treat ineffective assistance claims differently from
any other claim of trial error. Id. The rule addressed the inadequate record dilemma by
allowing an appellate court to remand a case to the district court to take evidence and make
factual findings necessary to resolve an ineffectiveness claim. See Utah R. App. P. 23B;
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 14. As the Utah Supreme Court explained: "If a defendant is
aware of any 'nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal,
which, if true, could support a determination that counsel was ineffective,' . . . defendant
bears the primary obligation and burden of moving for a temporary remand." Litherland,
2000 UT 76, ^| 16 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 23B). Because society has a compelling interest
in the finality of judgments, the general rule is that a defendant must raise, on direct appeal,
all of the errors that allegedly occurred at his trial. See id., 2000 UT 76,fflf11, 16-17.
Moreover, in 1996, the PCRA was enacted with provisions that bar a petitioner from
obtaining relief upon any claim that was raised, or could have been raised on direct appeal.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(c). Therefore, when a defendant is represented on appeal
by counsel other than trial counsel, he has both the opportunity, and the burden, to raise on
direct appeal all known claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See Litherland, 2000
UT 76 atffif9-17; Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(c).
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Petitioner could have and should have raised on direct appeal his claims that trial
counsel were ineffective. He was not represented by the same counsel at trial and on appeal.
He was represented by Ron Yengich and Bradley Rich at trial. See, e.g., R. 23-24, He was
represented on appeal by Scott Wiggins. See Allen, 2005 UT 11. On appeal, petitioner had
not only the opportunity, but also the burden to raise all claims, including ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, and, if necessary, to move for a temporary remand under Rule 23B
to create an adequate record for reviewing any ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims.
See Litherland, 12 P.3d^f 16. Here, all of petitioner's current claims of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel were known to petitioner at the time of his appeal. To the extent that
petitioner's ineffectiveness claims against his trial counsel can be identified from the petition,
they appear to be that his trial counsel (1) was "constructively" ineffective because he was
"hesitant to offend" the trial judge, who was allegedly "partial[] toward the State and [made]
rulings which are representative of a pro-state bias," and (2) "stipulated to a number of
issues without Mr. Allen being present." R82-83. Thus, to the extent that these claims are
alleged directly against trial counsel in post-conviction proceedings, these claims clearly
could have been raised on direct appeal. Consequently, the post-conviction court correctly
concluded that they, too, were procedurally barred and should be dismissed.7 See Order of
Dismissal, at R558, ^f 3. In sum, the Court should hold that the post-conviction court
correctly dismissed the eight claims based on procedural bar.

7

As stated, the only way to attack trial counsel's ineffectiveness is to attack
appellate counsel's ineffectiveness. Aple. Br. at Pt. II, pp. 20-23.
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B. Although unnecessary following its application of procedural bar,
the post-conviction court nevertheless impliedly concluded that claims
that jurors were not fair and impartial (claim 3) and that the trial court's
errors resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial (claim 8) were meritless.
The post-conviction court also disposed of petitioner's claims 3 and 8 on the merits,
even though it found them procedurally barred.8 See Order of Dismissal, at 558-59. As
listed by the court, claim 3 asserts that the "[j]urors were not fair and impartiar, and claim
8 asserts that "[e]rror for the trial court resulted] in a trial that was fundamentally unfair."
See Order to Respond, R201-02.
These two claims appear to have been based primarily on the affidavit of Trenton
David, dated June 28, 2005. See Petition, R79-80; Addendum I to Petition, R192-93
(Addendum F). In apparent support of claim 3, Mr. David asserted that he "witnessed jurors
disregarding instructions from the court not to expose one self [sic] to Media, and to not
discuss []case with other jury members during the trial." R193 at^f 11. He also asserted that
he "felt other jurors had bias [sic] opinions before trial began, from exposure from the
media." Id. at ^f 12.
In apparent support of claim 8, Mr. David asserted that the jury requested George
Taylor's trial testimony, which he asserted was "in conflict" with the testimony of another

8

Beyond the general ground for applying procedural bar—that petitioner could
have raised claim 3 on appeal but did not— there is the more specific ground that the
claim was raised and disposed of on direct appeal. In his direct appeal, petitioner alleged
juror misconduct based on a juror having received information from the media through
her husband concerning the defense's mistrial motion. Allen, 2007 UT 11, Tflf 45, 47-49,
52. That claim was founded on the same information on which claim 3 is based and is
substantially similar to it. This Court held that there was no juror misconduct. Id. at ^ 54.
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witness, Toby White, and "would have proved that Taylor was fabricating his testimony for
self gain." R192, atffif2, 8-9. Mr. David asserted that if he had received the requested
testimony, "it was very likely that [he] would have found Paul Allen innocent of all charges."
Rl92-93 atffl[4,10. "Unfortunately," Mr. David asserted, "Judge Dawson denied allowing
trial testimony to jurors during trial." R192 at ^ 7.
The post-conviction court granted the State's motion to strike the affidavit as it
violated rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, "which prohibits a juror's testimony, by
affidavit or otherwise, concerning jury deliberations." R559, ^f 6.9 Utah's appellate courts
have consistently held such testimony inadmissible to challenge a verdict. See e.g., State v.
DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 84 (Utah 1988); State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1,4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
In State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243 (Utah 1992) {Thomas IT), Justice Durham considered the
scope of rule 606(b) in connection with juror untruthfulness in voir dire and concluded that
a juror could testify as to the existence of extraneous information, "[but] not as to how far
that influence operated on his mind." 830 P.2d at 249 (Durham, J., writing for majority). See

9

Rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:

Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror
may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of
the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other
juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent
from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in
connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to bear
upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by
the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded
from testifying be received for these purposes.
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id. at 249 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 252 (Howe, J. and Hall, C.J., dissenting) (all
disparaging use of testimony of discussions in deliberations to impeach the verdict).
Here, Mr. David's statements about other jurors' alleged bias (claim 3) and the effect
the trial court's refusal to provide a witness's transcribed testimony had on his vote (claim
8) is plainly proscribed by rule 606(b). The post-conviction court so concluded: "Because
the juror affidavit purports to testify to matters concerning jury deliberations, it violates rule
606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which prohibits a juror's testimony, by affidavit or
otherwise, concerning jury deliberations." R559, f 6. Thus, the court's ruling striking the
affidavit was correct. Because the striking of the affidavit removed any factual basis for
claims 3 and 8, the court impliedly found both claims meritless.
C. The post-conviction court correctly concluded that petitioner's claim of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was too vague and speculative
to satisfy his burden under the PCRA.
"[T]o demonstrate the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a [post-conviction]
petitioner must first show that his counsel was objectively unreasonable in failing to find
arguable issues to appeal-that is, that counsel unreasonably failed to discover nonfrivolous
issues and to file a merits brief raising them." Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, *f 24 ,
P.3d

. "[T]he proper standard for evaluating [a petitioner's] claim that appellate counsel

was ineffective in neglecting to file a merits brief is that enunciated in Strickland v.
Washington, [466 U.S. 668 (1984)]."). Id. (citing Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285
(2000)). "If [a petitioner] succeeds in such a showing, he then has the burden of
demonstrating prejudice." Id. "That is, he must show a reasonable probability that, but for
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his counsel's unreasonable failure to file a merits brief, he would have prevailed on his
appeal." Id. (citing Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285). As stated, under the PCRA, the petitioner
bears the burden to show that he is entitled to relief by a preponderance of the evidence. See
Utah Code Ann. 78-35a-105.
The post-conviction court dismissed petitioner's ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel claims because it concluded that they were "too vague and speculative to meet his
burden under either the first or second Stricklandprong[s]." See Order of Dismissal, R559,

The record supports the court's ruling. In support of his claim, the petition and,
accordingly, petitioner's brief, state only the following:
[T] he defense was constructively ineffective due to the court's partiality
towards the State and rulings which are representative of a pro-state bias. For
example, the multiplicitous/duplicitous counts, the coercive "Allen"
instructions, the "Special Verdict Form," and the one-sided rulings given in
favor of the State. Mr. Allen's attorney stipulated to a number of issues
without Mr. Allen being present. This violated Mr. Allen's right to be present
at all trial proceedings which have a bearing on the outcome of trial. See
Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (per curiam) (1983).
During a number of in camera proceedings the judge essentially argued the
State's case and then ruled upon those judgments. . . . Mr. Yengich (my
lawyer) as an officer of the court would obviously be hesitant to offend a judge
(with apparent Pro-State leanings) who was presiding over the case at bar.
R82-83;Aplt.Br.at42-43.
Petitioner makes no explicit, detailed claims against his appellate attorneys in his
petition or any other pleading. The only claims of ineffective assistance articulated in the
petition and its supporting memorandum concern his trial attorneys, and those claims, as
27

discussed, were properly held to be procedurally barred. Aple. Br. at Pt. IIA. Indeed, the
first two sentences of his claim appear more directed to judicial bias than to ineffective
assistance. The final sentence, suggesting Mr. Yengich's "hesitanfce] to offend a judge with
apparent pro-State leanings," again seems to emphasize judicial bias, as opposed to
ineffective assistance of counsel. Any suggestion that this final point really constitutes a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as opposed to a rant against the court, is rebutted
by the complete absence of authority by which ineffective assistance of counsel is measured
or any analysis of how petitioner's counsel was ineffective or how his was prejudiced.
Arguably, petitioner's assertion, that "[his] attorney stipulated to a number of issues
without [petitioner] being present" and thereby violated his rights, may be regarded as a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. R83; Aplt. Br. at 44. However, as stated above,
the assertion does not clearly attack appellate counsel's performance. The statement does
not indicate what "issues" Mr. Yengich stipulated to in his absence. The statement is
unsupported by any record citation or any record facts that would help substantiate a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In sum, the post-conviction court rightly concluded that petitioner's claims were "too
vague and speculative" to satisfy his burden under Strickland. R559, U 5. The court might
also have reasonably concluded that the claim was inadequately briefed. See Aple. Br. at Pt.
I.
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D. The post-conviction court correctly concluded that the trial court rightly
chose not to provide the jurors with testimony of prosecution witnesses.
Notwithstanding the vague and speculative nature ofpetitioner' s inadequately briefed
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the court considered its one arguable aspect. It
considered whether appellate counsel ineffectively failed to argue that trial counsel were
ineffective when they stipulated to not giving prosecution witnesses' trial testimony to the
jury. R448-457. The court, however, apparently did not rule on the issue as though it was
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Order of Dismissal, R558,14. Rather, it
concluded that the trial court acted properly, even if defendant was not present. Id. In so
doing, the post-conviction court essentially ruled that trial counsel did not perform
deficiently. See Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, ^ 24 ("Failure to raise an issue that is
without merit 'does not constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel' because
the Sixth Amendment does not require an attorney to raise every nonfrivolous issue on
appeal") (quoting Carter III, 2001 UT 96, \ 48) (quoting Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508,
1515 (10th Cir. 1995)); State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 4l,1f 26, 1 P.3d 546 ("Failure to raise futile
objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel."). That ruling was correct.
See State v. Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79, ^ 14, 34 P.3d 187 ("fail[ure] to establish either of
the two parts of the Strickland'test, [establishes that] counsel's assistance was constitutionally
sufficient, and [the court] need not address the other part of the test.").
A defendant has a right to be present "at all trial proceedings which have a bearing
on the outcome of the trial." Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118 (1983)). See also State v.
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Lee, 585 P.2d 58 (Utah 1978). "The constitutional right to presence is rooted to a large
extent in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, but [the U.S. Supreme Court
has] recognized that this right is protected by the Due Process Clause in some situations
where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him.'9 United
States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (citation omitted).
However, a defendant's presence at all court proceedings is not required. As the
Supreme Court stated long ago: "[T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process
to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent
only." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1934) (emphasis added). Thus,
Gagnon, in interpreting the Snyder rule, found that the defendants' due process rights were
not violated when they were not present during an in camera discussion between the judge
and a juror concerning the juror's prejudice toward one of the defendants. Gagnon, 470 U.S.
at 527. Other courts have specifically held that a defendant's right to presence is not violated
by exclusion from post-verdict proceedings. Polizziv. United States, 550 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir.
1976). Courts have also stated that not all contact between the judge and a juror requires the
defendant's presence. See, e.g., State v. Baca, 950 P.2d 776, 785, ^ 38 (N.M. 1997) ("A
judge violates a defendant's right to be present at every stage of his trial only if the judge's
discussion with a juror concerns the subject matter of the case"). In short, there is no
constitutional violation where the communications between the judge and jury are not
relevant to the substance of the case.
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Disregarding, arguendo, petitioner's lack of specificity, the only proceedings for
which petitioner apparently was not present were four conferences with attorneys to discuss
responses to written questions from jurors.10 See Motion to Dismiss, R238-61, at 258-59.
The first three conferences dealt only with mundane matters—a request for a tape recorder
to play an exhibit, how late in the evening the court expected the jurors to deliberate on a
given night, and whether jurors could call home or a juror could feed her baby on break. See
id.
Only the fourth inquiry dealt with a matter relevant to the substance of case—the
jury's request for the testimony of two prosecution witnesses, George Taylor and Toby White
and the immunity agreement for Jennie Wright. See Motion to Dismiss, R259 (citing
Criminal R792; 2060:1875). The State and defense counsel both opposed this request. See
State's Reply Memorandum in Support of State's Motion to Dismiss Petition for PostConviction Relief ("Reply Memorandum"), R439-63, at 454 (citing Criminal R2060:1875).
The trial court drafted a response to the note, which was approved by the prosecutor and
defense attorney, advising jurors that they had to rely on their memories of the witnesses'
testimonies. See Reply Memorandum , R454 (citing Criminal R792).
The post-conviction court ruled that the trial court correctly chose not to provide the
jurors with the witnesses' testimony:

10

Petitioner states that there were other hearings at which he was not present.
R487-88. Even assuming the post-conviction court considered these alleged instances,
they cannot be corroborated or evaluated for their effect without an official record of the
trial proceedings, which is absent in this case.
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Petitioner also challenged the trial court's denial of the jurors' request that
testimony of prosecution witnesses be provided to them during their
deliberations. Upon receipt of the jurors' request, the court conferenced
with counsel for the State and the defendant. All agreed that the testimony
should not be provided. This accords with the rules of criminal procedure
and was therefore appropriate. See Utah R. Crim. P. 17(m). Accordingly,
petitioner's challenge to that ruling is without merit.
Order of Dismissal, R558, ^j 4.11 That ruling is correct.
Under rule 17(m), although a defendant has a right to be present when the court
responds to a jury's inquiry on a matter of law, he or she has no the right to have input on the
trial court's response to that inquiry. See State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1,4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
(rejecting defendant's claim that trial judge should have consulted with defendant and
counsel before responding to jury question).12 But even if the post-conviction court's

11

Petitioner nowhere claims that the post-conviction court erred by not ruling on
whether the trial court improperly refused to provide the jury with Jennie Wright's
immunity agreement.
12

Rule 17, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, states:

After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be
informed on any point of law arising in the case, they shall inform the
officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the court.
The court may then direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in
the presence of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to
the inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given.
Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to
the inquiry in writing without having the jury brought before the court, in
which case the inquiry and the response thereto shall be entered in the
record.
Utah R. Crim. P. 17(m). Paragraph (m) was redesignated as paragraph (n) after rule 17
was amended in 2002. Utah R. Crim. P. 17 advisory committee's note. Therefore,
paragraph (m), as set out above, would have been the applicable provision had this matter
been at issue in February 2000, when petitioner was tried.
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conclusion were erroneous, petitioner has failed to show that he was prejudiced by his
absence at the particular conference. See United States v. Gomez, 67 F.3d 1515, 1528 (10th
Cir. 1995) ("A deprivation of the constitutional right to be present at every critical stage of
the trial is still subject to harmless error analysis.") (citing Rogers v. United States, Ml U.S.
35, 40 (1975). See also State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, | 29, 52 P.3d 1210 ("Second, the
defendant must show that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial . . . .") (citing
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88)). Here, petitioner's
argument that he was prejudiced requires a showing that his presence at the conference
would likely have led to a different outcome at trial. Petitioner has not made that showing.
Even assuming, arguendo, that petitioner would have resisted his counsel's stipulation,
he has not argued that he would also not have opposed providing the jury with the witnesses'
testimony. More importantly, he cannot show that his presence would have had any effect
on the prosecutor's refusal to provide the jury with the testimony. The prosecutor opposed
the request for good reason. The general rule is that having portions of the unofficial
transcript read to the jury is "disfavored" because of its tendency to overemphasize that
testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 983,988 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing United
States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479, 486 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 462 U.S. 1123 (1983)); accord
State v. Hines, 307 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1957) ("It is . . . essential that the court observe
caution that evidence is not so selected, nor used in such a manner, that there is likelihood
of it being given undue weight or emphasis by the jury . . . .") Because the prosecutor
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objected to this "disfavored" practice and likely would have continued to do so even if
petitioner disagreed, it is highly likely that the jury's request would have still been denied.
Finally, petitioner cannot use the juror affidavit to attempt to bolster any claim of
prejudice. As the post-conviction court correctly determined, Mr. David's affidavit had to
be stricken under rule 606(b). See Order of Dismissal, R559, f 6. Thus, it cannot be used
to show that there is a reasonable probability that Mr. David would have voted for acquittal
if the testimony had been provided to him. In sum, petitioner has failed to show that, even
on the highly speculative assumption that his rights were violated when he was not present
at the conference between the judge and attorneys, he was prejudiced—i.e., that absent any
error there was a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons argued above, the Court should affirm the dismissal of the petition.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this , 2 7 day of August, 2007.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

Assistant Attorney General
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Addenda

Addendum 1

§ 78—2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state
law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to
final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating
with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a
first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first
degree felony or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling
on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
Laws 1986, c. 47, § 41; Laws 1987, c. 161, § 303; Laws 1988, c. 248, § 5; Laws 1989,
c. 67, § 1; Laws 1992, c. 127, § 11; Laws 1994, c. 191, § 2; Laws 1995, c. 267, § 5, eff.
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§ 78—2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service
Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands
Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources,
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the
state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving
a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except
petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first
degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging
the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a
first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody,
support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
Laws 1986, c. 47, § 46; Laws 1987, c. 161, § 304; Laws 1988, c. 73, § 1; Laws 1988, c.
210, § 141; Laws 1988, c. 248, § 8; Laws 1990, c. 80, § 5; Laws 1990, c. 224, § 3;
Laws 1991, c. 268, § 22; Laws 1992, c. 127, § 12; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 45; Laws 1995,
c. 299, § 47, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 159, § 19, eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 1996, c.
198, § 49, eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 2001, c. 255, § 20, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2001, c.
302, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001.

JUDICIAL CODE

§ 78-35a-lG5.
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Burden of proof

The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of
the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section
78-35a-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to
disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 5, eff. April 29, 1996.

§ 7 8 - 3 5 a - 1 0 6 . Preclusion of relief—Exception
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground
that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction
relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for postconviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal,
if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 6, eff. April 29, 1996.

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

RULE 3 . APPEAL AS OF RIGHT: HOW TAKEN
(a) Filing Appeal From Final Orders and Judgments. An appeal may be
taken from a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction
over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise
provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court
within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other
than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the
appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court deems
appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short
of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or Consolidated Appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make joinder
practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an appeal of
another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may
proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual appeals may be
consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own motion or upon
motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the separate appeals.
(c) Designation of Parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as the
appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the
appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as the
petitioner and any other party as the respondent.
(d) Content of Notice of Appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party
or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part
thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of Notice of Appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give notice
of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last known
address. A certificate evidencing such service shall be filed with the notice of
appeal. If counsel of record is served, the certificate of service shall designate
the name of the party represented by that counsel.
(f) Filing Fee in Civil Appeals. At the time of filing any notice of separate,
joint, ortross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the
clerk/of the trial court the filing fee established by law. The clerk of the trial
court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing fee is paid.
(gi Docketing of Appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment
of thV required fee, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit a
certified copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, and a copy
of the bohd required by Rule 6 or a certification by the clerk that the bond has
been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the copy of the
notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the
docket. An appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the action in the
trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain
the name of the appellant, such name shall be added to the title.
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 1996; November 1, 1999.]

R U L E 11. THE RECORD ON APPEAL.
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits
filed in the trial court, including the presentence report in criminal matters, the
transcript of proceedings, if any, the index prepared by the clerk of the trial
court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases.
A copy of the record certified by the clerk of the trial court to conform to the
original may be substituted for the original as the record on appeal. Only those
papers prescribed under paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the
appellate court.
(b) Pagination and indexing of record.
(b)(1) Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial
court shall securely fasten the record in a trial court case file, with collation in
the following order:
(b)(1)(A) the index prepared by the clerk;
(b)(1)(B) the docket sheet;
(b)(1)(C) all original papers in chronological order;
(b)(1)(D) all published depositions in chronological order;
(b)(1)(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order;
(b)(1)(F) a list of all exhibits offered in the proceeding; and
(b)(1)(G) in criminal cases, the presentence investigation report.
(b)(2)(A) The clerk shall mark the bottom right corner of every page of the
collated index, docket sheet, and all original papers as well as the cover page
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only of all published depositions and the cover page only of each volume of
transcripts constituting the record with a sequential number using one series of
numerals for the entire record.
(b)(2)(B) If a supplemental record is forwarded to the appellate court, the
clerk shall collate the papers, depositions, and transcripts of the supplemental
record in the same order as the original record and mark the bottom right
corner of each page of the collated original papers as well as the cover page
only of all published depositions and the cover page only of each volume of
transcripts constituting the supplemental record with a sequential number
beginning with the number next following the number of the last page of the
original record.
(b)(3) The clerk shall prepare a chronological index of the record. The index
shall contain a reference to the date on which the paper, deposition or
transcript was filed in the trial court and the starting page of the record on
which the paper, deposition or transcript will be found.
(b)(4) Clerks of the trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and
procedures for checking out the record after pagination for use by the parties in
preparing briefs for an appeal or in preparing or briefing a petition for writ of
certiorari.
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in
the event that more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply with
the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any other
action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and transmit
the record. A single record shall be transmitted.
(d) Papers on appeal.
(d)(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be included
by the clerk of the trial court as part of the record on appeal.
(d)(2) Civil cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua
sponte motion or motion of a party, the clerk of the trial court shall include all
of the papers in a civil case as part of the record on appeal.
(d)(3) Agency cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon
sua sponte motion or motion of a party, the agency shall include all papers in
the agency file as part of the record.
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice to
appellee if partial transcript is ordered.
(e)(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the
notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the court executive a transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the appellant
deems necessary. The request shall be in writing and shall state that the
transcript is needed for purposes of an appeal. Within the same period, a copy
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and the clerk of the appellate
court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a compressed format, appellant
shall include the request for a compressed format within the request for
transcript. If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested, within the
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same period the appellant shall file a certificate to that effect with the clerk of
the trial court and a copy with the clerk of the appellate court.
(e)(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or conelusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion
is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in
the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion.
Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript.
(e)(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by appellee. Unless the entire
transcript is to be included, the appellant shall, within 10 days after filing the
notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues that will be presented on appeal
and sh&ll serve on the appellee a copy of the request or certificate and a copy of
the statement. If the appellee deems a transcript of other parts of the
proceedings to be necessary, the appellee shall, within 10 days after the service
of the-request or certificate and the statement of the appellant, file and serve on
the appellant a designation of additional parts to be included. Unless within 10
days after service of such designation the appellant has requested such parts
and has so notified the appellee, the appellee may within the following 10 days
either request the parts or move in the trial court for an order requiring the
appellant to do so.
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on
appeal as defined in paragraph (a) of this rule, the parties may prepare and sign
a statement of the case, showing how the issues presented by the appeal arose
and were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of the facts
averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision of the
issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together with such
additions as the trial court may consider necessary fully to present the issues
raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the trial court. The clerk of the trial
court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate court within the
time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court shall transmit the
index of the record to the clerk of the appellate court upon approval of the
statement by the trial court.
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made or when
transcript is unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a
hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, or if the appellant is
impecunious and unable to afford a transcript in a civil case, the appellant may
prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available
means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on the' appellee,
who may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days after service.
The statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted
to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled and approved, shall
be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal.
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as to
whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the
difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made

to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from the
record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, the trial
court, or the appellate court, either before or after the record is transmitted,
may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if necessary that
a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The moving party, or the
court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the1 parties a statement of
the proposed changes. Within 10 days after service, any party may serve
objections to the proposed changes. All other questions as to the form and
content of the record shall be presented to the appellate court.
[Amended effective October 1/ 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; January 1, 1998; April
1, 1998; November 1, 1999; April 1, 2001; November 1, 2002; November 1, 2004;
April 1, 2005.]

RULE 2 3 B . MOTION TO REMAND FOR FINDINGS NECESSARY TO
DETERMINATION OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM
(a) Grounds for Motion; Time* A party to an appeal in a criminal case may
move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact,
necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. The motion shall be available only upon a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if
true, could support a determination that counsel was ineffective.
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief. Upon a
showing of good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the filing
of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to be filed
after oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from
remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim
has been raised and the motion would have been available to a party.
(b) Content of Motion; Response; Reply. The content of the motion shall
conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be
accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on
appeal that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The
affidavits shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the
appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. The motion shall
also be accompanied by a proposed order or remand that identifies the
ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such
claim to be addressed on remand.
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the motion is filed. The
response shall include a proposed order of remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such claim to be
addressed by the trial court in the event remand is granted, unless the
responding party accepts that proposed by the moving party. Any reply shall be
filed within 10 days after the response is filed.
(c) Order of the Court. If the requirements of parts (a) and (b) of this rule
have been met, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to
the trial court for the purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The order of remand shall identify the
ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual issues relevant to each such claim
to be addressed by the trial court. The order shall also direct the trial court to
complete the proceedings on remand within 90 days of issuance of the order of
remand, absent a finding by the trial court of good cause for a delay of
reasonable length.
If it appears to the appellate court that the appellant's attorney of record on
the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the court shall direct that

(d) Effect on Appeal, Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be
vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other procedural steps required by* these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand,
unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties or
upon the court's motion.
(e) Proceedings Before the Trial Court. Upon remand the trial court shall
promptly conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the findings
of fact necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Any claims of ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand shall not be
considered by the trial court on remand, unless the trial court determines that
the interests of justice or judicial efficiency require consideration of issues not
specifically identified in the order of remand. Evidentiary hearings shall be
conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable after remand. The burden
of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the fact. The standard of proof
shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court shall enter written
findings of fact concerning the claimed deficient performance by counsel and
the claimed prejudice suffered by appellant as a result, in accordance with the
order of remand. Proceedings on remand shall be completed within 90 days of
entry of the order of remand, unless the trial court finds good cause for a delay
of reasonable length.
(fTPreparation and Transmittal of the Record. At the conclusion of all
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court
reporter shall immediately prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings
as required by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the
trial court has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial
court shall immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings
upon preparation of the supplemental record. If the record of the original
proceedings before the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate
court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental
proceedings upon the preparation of the entire record.
(g) Appellate Court Determination. Upon receipt of the record from the
trial court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule for
briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been
made during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals.
The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the same
standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals.
[Adopted effective October 1, 1992; amended effective April 1, 1998 ]

RULE 2 4 .

BRIEFS

(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agenc^
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties., The list should be
set out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover.
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum^ with page
references.
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to
the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
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(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting aulhority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the
trial court; or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved
in the trial court.
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of
this rule.
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this
rule.
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in
the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under
which the argument is arranged.
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons
of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall
state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award.
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(a)(ll) An addendum to the brief or a statement that "no addendum is
necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the
brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is
bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:
(a)(ll)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(a)(ll)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a "copy of the Court of
Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the
appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter
service; and
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance
to the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings
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of fact and conclusions^ of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the
court's oral decision, or the contract OP document -subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief o£ the appellee shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not
include:
(b)(1)" a ^statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or
(b)(2) .ari addendum, "except to provide material not included in the addendum of the- appellant. , The appellee may refer to the addendum of the
appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in
reply to the response^ of the appellant to the issues presented by the crossappeal, Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in
the opposing Tirief.^ The content of the reply brief shall conform to the
requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties- Counsel will be expected in their briefs
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such
designations as*~"appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity, io use the
designations used~in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual
name^ of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured
person,"/'the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages
of the originaLrecqrd as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by
the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers.
If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy,
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was
identified, offered, and received or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs'. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by
paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of
this rule sets forth the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals.» If a cross-appeal is filed, the
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the
parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. Each party shall be

entitled to file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs
shall in combination exceed 75 pages.
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the
issues raised in the appeal
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and
Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of
Appellant and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal.
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant
and Brief of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and
respond to the Brief of Cross-Appellant.
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which
shall reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee.
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the
cflurt for good cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that
exceeds the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the
issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good
cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days before the
date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before
the date the brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be
accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the
motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of
additional pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is
granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another.
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for the
supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and
shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise,
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte
by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending
lawyer.
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998;
November 1, 1999; April 1, 2003; November 1, 2004; April 1, 2006; November 1,
2006.]

RULES OF EVIDENCE

RULE 6 0 6 . COMPETENCY OF JUROR AS WITNESS
(a) At the Trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness before
that jury in the trial of the case in which the juror is sitting. If the juror is
called so to testify, the opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity to object
out of the presence of the jury.
(b) Inquiry Into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon an inquiry into the
validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or
statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect
of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the
juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or* concerning the
juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify
on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly
brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any
statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be
precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
[Amended effective October 1, 1992.]
Advisory Committee Note
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, law, State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d
and comports with Rules 41 and 44, Utah 662 (1972).
Rules of Evidence (1971), and Utah case

RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

RULE 17. THE TRIAL
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial
with the following exceptions:
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent
in writing to trial in his absence;
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; and
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause
shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct.
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal
attendance of the defendant at the trial.
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order:
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody;
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody;
(3)
(4)
(c)
open

felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and
misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance.
All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury in
court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution.

(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes
written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise.
No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction.
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified in
Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953.
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the
accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or made orally
in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any
number of jurors less than otherwise required.
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in
the following order:
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated;
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the defense may make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has
rested;
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge;
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case;
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court,
for good cause, otherwise permits;
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the
court shall instruct the jury; and
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides
without argument, the prosecution shall open the argument, the defense shall
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follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument,
The court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each
party and the time to be allowed for argument.
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an
alternate juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate
juror. If no alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed
with the number of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged
and a new trial ordered.
(i) Questions by jurors. A judge may invite jurors to submit written' questions to a witness as provided in this section.
(1) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall control the
process to ensure the jury maintains its role as the impartial finder of fact and
does not become an investigative body. The judge may disallow any question
from a juror and may discontinue questions from jurors at any time.
(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge should advise
the jurors that they may write the question as it occurs to them and submit the
question to the bailiff for transmittal to the judge. The judge should advise the
jurors that some questions might not be allowed.
(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and unrepresented
parties and rule upon any objection to the question. The judge may disallow a
question even though no objection is made. The judge shall preserve the
written question in the court file. If the question is allowed, the judge shall ask
the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party to ask it. The
question may be rephrased into proper form. The judge shall allow counsel
and unrepresented parties to examine the witness after the juror's question.
(j) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other
material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the
charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person
appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that while
the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so
appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with
the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a
specified time.
(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate
or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty
not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally
submitted to them.
(/) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits which have been received as evidence, except
exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the
jury, such as exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court shall
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permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled to take notes
during the trial and to have those notes with them during deliberations. As
necessary, the court shall provide jurors with writing materials and instruct the
jury on taking and using notes.
(m) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together
in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a
verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by
order of the court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow any
communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask them if
they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is
rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations or the
verdict agreed upon.
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed on
any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of
them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then
direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the
jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be
recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing
without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and
the response thereto shall be entered in the record.
(o) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be
corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out
again.
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion
of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or
indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included
offense.
[Amended effective November 1, 2001; November 1, 2002.]
Advisory Committee Note
Paragraph (Z). The committee recommends amending paragraph (/) to establish
the right of jurors to take notes and to
have those notes with them during deliberations. The committee recommends removing depositions from the paragraph
not in order to permit the jurors to have

depositions but to recognize that depositions are not evidence. Depositions read
into evidence will be treated as any other
oral testimony. These amendments and
similar amendments to the Rules of Civil
Procedure will make the two provisions
identical.
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(6) trial court was not required to apply rebuttable
presumption of prejudice standard to claim of juror
misconduct.
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State v. Allen
Utah,2005.
Supreme Court of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Paul Christopher ALLEN, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20000531.
Feb. 11,2005.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 16, 2005.
Background: Defendant was convicted in the Second
District Court, Farmington County, GlenR. Dawson, J.,
of aggravated murder. Defendant appealed.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Durrant J., held that:
(1) other crimes evidence showing that defendant had
made fraudulent credit card purchases both preceding
and following his murder of victim was offered for
proper noncharacter purposes of establishing charged
conspiracy offense and proving preparation, plan,
intent, and knowledge;
{2} other crimes evidence was relevant;
(3) probative value of other crimes evidence
substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect;
(4) trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's request for mistrial following witness's
improper statement during his testimony that defendant
had been asked to take a lie detector test;
(5) trial court did not abuse its discretion in by refusing
to grant new trial after one ofjurors improperly learned
through her spouse that defense counsel had requested
a mistrial after witness's testimony and shared such
information with other jurors; and

Affirmed.
West Headnotes
HI Criminal Law 110 €=^1144.13(2.1)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
llOXXMNfl Presumptions
U0kll44 Facts or Proceedings Not Shown by
Record
110kll44.13 Sufficiency of Evidence
110k! 144.13(2) Construction of
Evidence
110kll44.13Q.n k. In General.
Most Cited Cases
Criminal Law 110 €^1144.13(5)
110 Criminal Law
11OXXIV Review
110XXMM) Presumptions
1 lQkl 144 Facts or Proceedings Not Shown by
Record
110kll44.13 Sufficiency of Evidence
HOkl 144.13(5) k. Inferences or
DeductionsfromEvidence. Most Cited Cases
On appealfroma jury verdict, an appellate court views
the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light
most favorable to that verdict and recites the facts
accordingly.
121 Criminal Law 110 €=>370
110 Criminal Law
11 OX VII Evidence
HOXVIIfF) Other Offenses
110k370 k. Acts Showing Knowledge. Most
Cited Cases
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110 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
110XVIKF) Other Offenses
110k371 Acts Showing Intent or Malice or
Motive
110k371(4) k. In Prosecutions for
Homicide. Most Cited Cases

110XXIV(N) Discretion of Lower Court
110k! 153 Reception and Admissibility of
Evidence; Witnesses
110kll53(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
When examining a trial court's decision to admit other
crimes evidence, an appellate court reviews such
decision for an abuse of discretion. Rules of Evid.,
Rule 404(b).

Criminal Law 110 €=^371(12)

HI Criminal Law 110 €==>1153(1)

110 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
110XVIKF) Other Offenses
110k371 Acts Showing Intent or Malice or
Motive
110k371(12) k. Motive. Most Cited Cases

110 Criminal Lav/
110XXIV Review
llOXXIVfN) Discretion of Lower Court
110k! 153 Reception and Admissibility of
Evidence; Witnesses
HOkl 153(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
In reviewing a trial court's decision to admit other
crimes evidence for an abuse of discretion, an appellate
court reviews the record to determine whether the
admission of other crimes evidence was scrupulously
examined by the trial judge in the proper exercise of
that discretion. Rules of Evid., Rule 404(b).

Criminal Law 110 €=>372(4)
110 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
110XVIKF) Other Offenses
110k372 Acts Part of Series Showing System
or Habit
110k372(4) k. Homicide. Most Cited Cases
Other crimes evidence showing that defendant had
made fraudulent credit card purchases both preceding
and following his murder of victim, who was
defendant's wife, was offered in prosecution for
aggravated murder and conspiracy to commit
aggravated murder for proper noncharacter purposes of
establishing conspiracy offense and proving
preparation, plan, intent, and knowledge; fraudulent
purchases demonstrated means by which defendant
sought to conceal his payments to individual who
allegedly helped arrange for victim's murder, and
fraudulent purchases demonstrated how defendant
planned to account for his own discretionary spending
and thereby disguise his payments to individual. Rules
ofEvid., Rule 404(b).

151 Criminal Law 110 €==>369.2(1)
110 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
110XVIKF) Other Offenses
110k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of
Offense Charged in General
110k369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense,
Also Relating to Other Offenses in General
110k369.2(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
In determining whether other crimes evidence is
admissible, a court must first make an initial
determination as to whether other crimes evidence is
being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose. Rules
of Evid.. Rule 404(b).

131 Criminal Law 110 €^>1153(1)

161 Criminal Law 110 €==>369.2(1)

110 Criminal Law
11QXXIV Review

110 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
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110XVIKF) Other Offenses
110k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of
Offense Charged in General
110k369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense,
Also Relating to Other Offenses in General
110k369.2(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Other crimes evidence is not precluded so long as the
evidence is offered for a legitimate purpose other than
to show the defendant's propensity to commit the crime
charged. Rules of Evid.. Rule 404(b).
iH Criminal Law 110 €^369.2(4)
110 Criminal Law
11OXVII Evidence
110XVIKF) Other Offenses
U0k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of
Offense Charged in General
110k369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense,
Also Relating to Other Offenses in General
110k369.2(3) Particular Offenses,
Prosecutions for
110k369.2(4) k. Assault, Homicide,
Abortion and Kidnapping. Most Cited Cases
In prosecution for aggravated murder and conspiracy to
commit aggravated murder, other crimes evidence
showing that defendant had made fraudulent credit card
purchases both preceding and following his murder of
victim, who was defendant's wife, was relevant to
whether defendant had conspired to kill victim;
evidence of how defendant concealed his payments to
individual who allegedly helped arrange for victim's
murder corroborated individual's account of the events
and therefore ultimately supported the State's allegation
that defendant had conspired with individual to murder
victim. Rules ofEvid., Rules 401, 402, 404(b).
[81 Criminal Law 110 €=^369.2(1)
110 Criminal Law
11 OXVII Evidence
110XVIKF) Other Offenses
110k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of
Offense Charged in General
110k369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense,
Also Relating to Other Offenses in General

110k369.2(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Even if other crimes evidence is offered for a proper,
noncharacterpurpose, a court must also determine
whether the evidence is relevant. Rules of Evid., Rules
401. 402, 404(b).
121 Criminal Law 110 €==>338(7)
110 Criminal Law
11 OXVII Evidence
llOXVH(D) Facts in Issue and Relevance
110k338 Relevancy in General
110k338(7) k. Evidence Calculated to
Create Prejudice Against or Sympathy for Accused.
Most Cited Cases
Criminal Law 110 €=>369.2(4)
110 Criminal Law
11 OXVII Evidence
110XVIKF) Other Offenses
110k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of
Offense Charged in General
110k369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense,
Also Relating to Other Offenses in General
110k369.2(3) Particular Offenses,
Prosecutions for
110k369.2(4) k. Assault, Homicide,
Abortion and Kidnapping. Most Cited Cases
Probative value of other crimes evidence showing that
defendant had made fraudulent credit card purchases
both preceding and following his murder of victim, who
was defendant's wife, sufficiently outweighed danger of
unfair prejudice to be admissible in prosecution for
aggravated murder and conspiracy to commit
aggravated murder; need for the evidence was
significant, as fraudulent purchases were direct
evidence of defendant's participation in the conspiracy
and corroborated the testimony of witness that
defendant had paid individual to arrange for victim's
murder, evidence of fraudulent purchases was strong,
and it was unlikely that defendant's involvement in
fraudulent activities would have roused the jury to
overmastering hostility, especially in light of the gravity
of the offenses for which he was charged. Rules of
Evid.. Rules 403. 404(b).
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UOl Criminal Law 110 €==>338(7)
110 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
llOXVH(D) Facts in Issue and Relevance
110k338 Relevancy in General
110k338(7) k. Evidence Calculated to
Create Prejudice Against or Sympathy for Accused.
Most Cited Cases
Criminal Law 110 €==>369.1
110 Criminal Law
11 OX VII Evidence
110XVIKF) Other Offenses
110k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of
Offense Charged in General
110k369.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Criminal Law 110 €=>675
110 Criminal Law
110XX Trial
HOXX(C) Reception of Evidence
110k675 k. Cumulative Evidence in General.
Most Cited Cases
Even if other crimes evidence is offered for a proper,
noncharacter purpose and is relevant, a trial court may
exclude the evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Rules
ofEvid.. Rules 403, 404fb).
[Ill Criminal Law 110 €^>867
110 Criminal Law
110XX Trial
11 QXX(J) Issues Relating to Jury Trial
110k867 k. Discharge of Jury Before Verdict.
Most Cited Cases
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
murder defendant's request for mistrial following
witness's improper statement during his testimonythat
defendant had been asked to take a lie detector test;
reference was not intentionally elicited or planned,
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reference was vague and mentioned only that defendant
had been asked to take a lie detector test-not that
defendant had actually taken or failed to pass such a
test, reference was brief and came only near the end of
a three-hour direct examination, Mai proceedings
continued without undue interruption after reference,
and following reference, no further attention was
directed to either a lie detector test or witness's
reference, and trial court offered to give the jury a
curative instruction regarding the reference, which
defendant declined.
[121 Criminal Law 110 €^>1155
110 Criminal Law
11OXXIV Review
llOXXIVfN) Discretion of Lower Court
1 lOkl 155 k. Custody and Conduct of Jury.
Most Cited Cases
Once a district court has exercised its discretion and
denied a motion for a mistrial, an appellate court will
not reverse the court's decision unless it is plainly
wrong in that the incident so likely influenced the jury
that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial.
[131 Criminal Law 110 €==>867
110 Criminal Law
110XX Trial
110XX(T) [ssues Relating to Jury Trial
110k867 k. Discharge of Jury Before Verdict.
Most Cited Cases
A mistrial is not required where an improper statement
by a witness is not intentionally elicited, is made in
passing, and is relatively innocuous in light of all the
testimony presented.
[141 Criminal Law 110 €^925.5(1)
110 Criminal Law
110XXI Motions for New Trial
11 Qk924 Misconduct of or Affecting Jurors
U()k925.5 Considering Matters Not in
Evidence
110k925.5m k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
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Criminal Law 110 €==>928
110 Criminal Law
110XXI Motions for New Trial
110k924 Misconduct of or Affecting Jurors
110k928 k. Communications by or with
Jurors. Most Cited Cases
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in murder trial
by refusing to grant new trial after one of jurors
improperly learned through her spouse that defense
counsel had requested a mistrial after witness's
testimony and shared such information with other
jurors; juror's comment was apparently brief and
contained no substantive information concerning the
mistrial motion, and jury did not, in fact, discuss
defendant's motion for a mistrial.
[151 Criminal Law 110 € ^ 1 1 5 6 ( 1 )
110 Criminal Law
11OXXIV Review
llOXXIVfN) Discretion of Lower Court
110k! 156 New Trial
110kll56(n k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
When reviewing a trial court's denial of amotion for a
new trial, an appellate court will not reverse absent a
clear abuse of discretion.
[161 Criminal Law 110 € ^ 1 1 3 4 ( 4 )
110 Criminal Law
11 OXXIV Review
HOXXIV(L) Scope of Review in General
110k! 134 Scope and Extent in General
110k 1134(4) k. Rulings on Motion for
New Trial. Most Cited Cases
When reviewing atrial court's denial of a motion for a
new trial, appellate court reviews legal standards
applied by the trial court in denying motion for
correctness.
[171 Criminal Law 110 €=^1163(6)
110 Criminal Law
11 OXXIV Review
llOXXIVrO) Harmless and Reversible Error

1 lQkl 163 Presumption as to Effect of Error
HOkl 163(6) k. Misconduct of or Affecting
Jurors. Most Cited Cases
When any unauthorized contact during atrial between
witnesses, attorneys or court personnel and jurors goes
beyond a mere incidental, unintended, and brief contact,
there is a rebuttable presumption of prejudice, and to
counteract this presumption the prosecution must prove
that the unauthorized contact did not influence the
juror.
1181 Criminal Law 110 €=^1163(6)
110 Criminal Law
11 OXXIV Review
llOXXIVfO) Harmless and Reversible Error
U0kll63 Presumption as to Effect of Error
HOkl 163(6) k. Misconduct of or Affecting
Jurors. Most Cited Cases
Rebuttable presumption of prejudice that arises when
any unauthorized contact during a trial between
witnesses, attorneys or court personnel and jurors goes
beyond a mere incidental, unintended, and brief contact
only applies when the contact is between a juror and
other court participants, not jurors and third parties
unrelated to the proceedings.
[191 Criminal Law 110 €==>855(8)
110 Criminal Law
110XX Trial
HOXXffl Issues Relating to Jury Trial
110k855 Misconduct of or Affecting Jurors
110k855(8) k. Communication Between
Jurors and Third Persons. Most Cited Cases
Criminal Law 110 €=>1163(6)
110 Criminal Law
11 OXXIV Review
HOXXIV(O) Harmless and Reversible Error
110k 1163 Presumption as to Effect of Error
HOkl 163(6) k. Misconduct of or Affecting
Jurors. Most Cited Cases
Trial court was not required to apply rebuttable
presumption of prejudice standard to claim of juror
misconduct, which resulted after juror improperly

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

108 P.3d730
108 P.3d 730, 519 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2005 UT 11
(Cite as: 108 P.3d 730)

learned through her spouse that defense counsel had
requested a mistrial after witness's testimony and shared
such information with other jurors; while State's witness
and defense counsel were directly involved in events
that ultimately caused press to report on defendant's
motion for mistrial, only unauthorized "contact" that
occurred was between juror and spouse.

*732 Mark L. Shurtleff Att'y Gen., Kenneth A.
Bronston, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, and William
K. McGuire, Farmington, for plaintiff.
ToddA.Utzinger, Scott L.Wiggins, Salt Lake City, for
defendant.
DURRANT, Justice:
^ 1 Defendant Paul Christopher Allen appeals his
conviction for aggravated murder. He argues that
numerous prejudicial errors occurred during the course
of his trial and requests that this court reverse his
conviction. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
HI If 2 "On appeal from a jury verdict, we view the
evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most
favorable to that verdict and recite the facts
accordingly." State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 351
(Utah 1996).
K 3 On the evening of August 28, 1996, police were
called to Allen's North Salt Lake City apartment, where
they discovered Allen and the lifeless body of Allen's
wife, Jill, lying on the hallway floor. Blood spatter
covered the walls near Jill's body, and the carpet
beneath her was soaked with blood. Jill's belt was
broken and her clothing was pushed back, exposing her
body from neck to ankles. The contents of her purse
had been dumped out and scattered across the kitchen
counter. A baseball bat lay in the doorway of a nearby
bedroom.
If 4 Although the evidence at the scene indicated that
there had been a struggle, there was no sign of forced
entry through any of the apartment's doors or windows.
A forensic pathologist later certified Jill's cause of
death as the result of strangulation and blunt force
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trauma to the head. Despite indications that would
suggest otherwise, the pathologist determined that there
was no evidence of sexual assault.
% 5 Sergeant John Herndon, the lead investigator on the
case, pursued several leads in the months following
Jill's murder without success before Brandon Nicholsen
came forward with information about the homicide.
Nicholsen informed Sergeant Herndon that he,
Nicholsen, had helped a coworker, George Anthony
Taylor, dispose of evidence *733 related to the murder
of a woman in North Salt Lake.
f 6 In exchange for immunity for hispart in the crime,
Nicholsen recounted that three weeks before Jill's
murder, Taylor had told him that he, Taylor, and
another man, Joseph Wright, had b een hired by a
"Paul" to kill Paul's wife, and that Taylor would receive
between $5,000 and $10,000 for his part in the murder.
When Nicholsen confronted Taylor about his
involvement after hearing a television report about Jill's
murder, Taylor admitted to the killing. Taylor told
Nicholsen that he entered Jill's home with a key
provided by Allen. When the gun he had intended to
shoot her with misfired, Taylor explained that he struck
Jill in the head first with the gun and later with a
baseball bat before he finally strangled her to death.
Taylor later admitted that he had emptied the contents
of Jill's purse and staged her body to make it look like
a robbery and a sexual assault.
If 7 Following Nicholsen's disclosures, police arrested
Taylor for Jill's murder. When Taylor confessed to his
part in the murder and implicated Wright, police also
arrested Wright.
^ 8 Wright confessed to police that Allen had first
approached him near the end of 1995 and indicated that
he, Allen, knew someone at his work who wanted "a
guy" killed for $ 10,000. When Allen asked if Wright
was interested, Wright told Allen that he would "see
what [he] could do." Sometime later, Allen told
Wright specifically that he was having problems in his
marriage and that he wanted his wife, Jill, killed. Allen
stated that he would pay Wright $30,000 out of Jill's
$50,000 life insurance policy for the murder. Wright
agreed to the proposal, and the two thereafter discussed
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various methods of committing the murder and finding
someone to do the job. In April 1996, Taylor agreed
to murder Jill.
% 9 Wright testified that, to facilitate the murder, Allen
paid Wright in cash at various times before and after the
killing in an amount totaling between $14,000 and
$ 16,000. Wright stated that Allen promised to pay the
balance owingto Wright when Allen's negotiations with
the insurance company were resolved.
1f 10 Following the police investigation, the State
charged Allen with aggravated murder, conspiracy to
commit aggravated murder, and criminal solicitation in
connection with Jill's murder.— A jury found Allen
guilty of aggravated murder at the conclusion of Allen's
trial, and Allen was sentenced to life with the possibility
of parole.

FN1. The State also charged Allen with filing
a false or fraudulent insurance claim, which
was later dismissed.
Tf 11 On appeal, Allen identifies numerous errors that he
alleges occurred during his trial. Specifically, he raises
six issues that, according to Allen, warrant reversal of
his conviction. Because several of these issues are
inadequately briefed, however, we address only whether
the district court abused its discretion in (1) allowing
the State to introduce evidence under Utah Rule of
Evidence 404(b) that Allen had made fraudulent credit
card purchases, (2) refusing to grant a mistrial after
Wright testified that Allen had been asked by the police
to take a lie detector test, and (3) refusing to grant a
new trial based on juror misconduct.— We have
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 7 8-2-2(3 )(i)
(2002).

FN2. Because they are inadequately briefed,
we do not address the remaining issues raised
by Allen on appeal relating to (1) the district
court's refusal to grant a mistrial after a
witness testified that Allen had retained an
attorney prior to his arrest, (2) the district
court's reasonable doubt jury instruction, and

(3) cumulative error. See, e.g., Smith v. Four
Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT
23,1146, 70P.3d904 (declining to address an
inadequately briefed argument).
ANALYSIS
I. UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(b)

£2J Tf 12 We first examine Allen's contention that the
district court abused its discretion under Utah Rule of
Evidence 404(b) when it admitted evidence showing
that Allen had made fraudulent credit card purchases
both preceding and following his wife's murder.
*734 If 13 During Allen's trial, the State was allowed to
introduce evidence that, while employed as an AT & T
sales representative, Allenmisappropriated confidential
credit information from at least two of his clients and
used this information to fraudulently obtain credit cards
and purchase several personal items from various
retailers, including JC Penney, Pro Golf, Uintah Golf,
and the Bombay Company.— Wright also testified that
Allen had told him that he, Allen, was using stolen
credit cards from his AT & T clients to make purchases
at several different locations in order to account for the
discretionary income he was using to pay Wright.

FN3. Specifically, the State introduced various
fraudulent applications for store credit and
receipts evidencing Allen's fraudulent
purchases, which included, among others
items, golf clubs and various golf accessories,
a king-size bed, and several hundred dollars
worth of bedding. The State also introduced
phone records showing that Allen had used his
cellular phone to place calls to the Bombay
Company where one of the fraudulent
purchases was made.
f 14 Allen argues that the district court abused its
discretion under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) when it
permitted the State to introduce evidence of Allen's
fraudulent purchases. The State counters that the
district court did not abuse its discretion for two
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reasons. First, it asserts that the evidence of Allen's
fraudulent purchases does not implicate rule 404(b)
since it was introduced not as evidence of "other
crimes, wrongs, or acts," Utah R. Evid. 404(b)
(emphasis added), but as an act committed directly in
furtherance of the charged conspiracy. In support of
this assertion, the State cites several federal cases in
which courts have concluded that rule 404(b) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence applies only "to evidence of
acts extrinsic to the crime charged." United States v.
Green, 175 F.3d 822, 831 (10th Cir.1999) (internal
quotations omitted); accord, e.g., United States v.
Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 125 (D.C.Cir.2003) ("Rule
404(b) applies only to 'extrinsic' evidence of other
crimes and not to 'intrinsic' evidence of the same
crime."); United States v. Abrezo, 141 F.3d 142, 175
(5th Cir. 1998) ("[E] vidence of acts committed pursuant
to a conspiracy and offered to prove the defendant's
membership or participation in the conspiracy are not
extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence of 'other' acts, for
purposes of Rule 404(b)." (internal quotations
omitted)). Alternatively, the State argues that the
district court did not abuse its discretion because the
evidence of Allen's fraudulent purchases satisfies the
requirements of Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b).
f3ir41 \ 15 We need not consider whether the evidence
of Allen's fraudulent purchases was admissible as
"intrinsic evidence" under a federal analysis because we
conclude that it was admissible under a traditional Utah
Rule of Evidence 404(b) analysis. When examining a
district court's decision to admit evidence under Utah
Rule of Evidence 404(b), we review for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Nelson-Wagoner, 2000 UT 59, \
16, 6 P.3d 1120. In so doing, "[w]e review the record
to determine whether the admission of other bad acts
evidence was scrupulously examined by the [district]
judge in the proper exercise of that discretion." Id.
(internal quotations omitted).
1 16 Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b)provides that
[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
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accident...
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). We have held that rule 404(b)
allows for the introduction of bad acts evidence if the
evidence satisfies the following three criteria: (1) the
evidence is offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose,
such as one of those listed in rule 404(b): (2) the
evidence meets the requirements of rule 402: and (3)
the evidence meets the requirements of rule 403.
Nelson-Wagoner, 2000 UT 59 at HTf 18-20, 6 P.3d
1120 (citing State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, Iff 21-22,
29, 993 P.2d 837). We examine each of these criteria
in turn.

A. Proper, Noncharacter Purpose
\51\6\ If 17 Under the first part of a rule 404(b) analysis,
a court must make an initial determination as to whether
the bad acts *735 evidence is being offered for a
proper, noncharacter purpose. Id. atf 18. Rule 404(b)
lists several purposes for which evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts maybe admitted, "such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). This list is not exhaustive,
however, and evidence demonstrating other purposes is
not precluded so long as the evidence is offered for a
legitimate purpose other than to show the defendant's
propensity to commit the crime charged. See State v.
Houskeever, 2002 UT 118, 1111 27-28, 62 P.3d 444:
State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67,Iff! 26-27, 52 P.3d
1194.
1f 18 Here, the district court found that if the evidence
of Allen's fraudulent purchases came in as the State
anticipated, "the evidence would be relevant for an
appropriate purpose and non-character purpose; that is,
intent, preparation, plan and knowledge." The court
also reasoned that thefraudulentpurchases were proper,
noncharacter evidence of the conspiracy with which
Allen was charged. We reject Allen's assertion that the
district court abused its discretion in concluding that the
fraudulent purchase evidence was admissible for these
proper and noncharacter purposes.
K 19 First, it is evident that the State introduced the
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fraudulent purchases not to show that Allen had a
propensity to commit crime, but rather, to establish that
Allen had engaged in a conspiracy to murder his wife
and that he had employed Wright as a middleman in
order to facilitate this action. The fraudulent purchases
were direct evidence of acts Allen committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy and demonstrated the
means by which Allen sought to conceal his payments
to Wright.^

FN4. Allen repeatedly argues that the State
has failed to establish "any connection"
between Allen's fraudulent purchases and his
conspiracy to murder Jill. This is incorrect.
Wright clearly testified during trial that Allen
had represented to Wright that he, Allen, was
using his clients' stolen information to make
fraudulent purchases from various stores in
order to account for the money he was paying
to Wright.
Wright's testimony therefore
directly linked Allen's fraudulent purchases to
the conspiracy.
If 20 Additionally, the evidence regarding Allen's
fraudulent transfers was also admitted for the proper,
noncharacter purposes of proving preparation, plan,
intent, and knowledge. This evidence demonstrated
how Allen planned to account for his own discretionary
spending and thereby disguise his payments to Wright.
It also was connected with the advance payments Allen
made to Wright in preparation for the murder, and
illustrated that Allen knowingly engaged in the
conspiracy with the intent to murder his wife.

noncharacter purpose, a court must also determine
whether the evidence is relevant under Utah Rule of
Evidence 402. Nelson-Wazsoner, 2000 UT 59 at If 19,
6 P.3d 1120.
Relevant evidence is defined as
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401.
£81 Tf 23 Here, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that the evidence of Allen's
fraudulent purchases was relevant to the question of
whether Allen had conspired to kill his wife. As the
district court accurately observed, the evidence of how
Allen concealed his payments to Wright corroborated
Wright's account of the events and therefore ultimately
supported the State's allegation that Allen had conspired
with Taylor and Wright to murder his wife. The
evidence of Allen's fraudulent purchases made the
existence of a conspiracy and the actions taken in
furtherance thereof more probable than if the evidence
were not admitted.

*736 C. Probative Value Versus Prejudicial Effect
Under Rule 403

B. Relevance Under Ride 402

r9iri01 If 24 Finally, even if evidence is offered for a
proper, noncharacter purpose and is relevant, a district
court must determine whether the probative value of the
evidence " ' is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.'
" Nelson-Wazzoner, 2000 UT 59 at f 20, 6 P.3d 1120
(quoting Utah R. Evid. 403). In considering whether
to exclude otherwise admissible evidence under rule
403, we have stated that a district court should evaluate
several factors, including
the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the
other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the
need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof,
and the degree to which the evidence probably will
rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.

[7] f 22 Even if evidence is offered for a proper,

Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at If 29, 993 P.2d 837 (quoting

f 21 Because the State introduced evidence of Allen's
fraudulent purchases for these legitimate reasons and
not simply to show that Allen had a propensity to
commit crime, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that the State's evidence was
introduced for a proper, noncharacter purpose under
rule 404(b).
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State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291. 295-96 (Utah 1988)
(further citation omitted)). We hereinafter refer to
these factors as the "Shickles factors."
\ 25 Allen argues that the district court abused its
discretion in allowing evidence of the fraudulent
purchases to be admitted because, according to Allen,
the record lacks "any indication" that the district court
gave "any real consideration of the matters to be
considered in the course of performing" the requisite
balancing required by rule 403 . He argues that,
without evidence that the district court examined and
considered the various Shickles factors described
above, we must conclude that the district court erred in
allowing the State to introduce evidence of Allen's
fraudulent purchases. We disagree.
f 26 A review of the record demonstrates that the
district court carefully balanced the probative value of
the evidence against its prejudicial effect. Although
the court acknowledged that the fraudulent purchase
evidence would connect Allen with an uncharged
wrong, it reasoned that such connection did not render
the evidence inadmissible. The court explained that
the probative value of the fraudulent purchases as direct
evidence of Allen's participation in a conspiracy to
commit murder was significant and relevant to showing
Allen's preparation, plan, knowledge, and intent.
Moreover, the court did not find the evidence to be
particularly inflammatory or egregious.
% 27 The record also reveals that the district court
sought to minimize any confusion that introduction of
the fraudulent purchase evidence may have caused by
instructing the jury that the evidence was "not to be
considered... to prove that [Allen was] a person of bad
character or that he ha[d] a disposition to commit
crimes," but rather "only for the limited purpose of
determining if it tend[ed] to show: proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or
absence of mistake." Additionally, the introduction of
the evidence did not cause unnecessary delay, since the
State introduced the majority of its evidence relating to
Allen's fraudulent credit card applications and
purchases through stipulated exhibits, and all other
references made of Allen's fraudulent activities were
relatively brief.
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If 28 We acknowledge that, in reaching its conclusion
that the probative value of the fraudulent purchase
evidence was not substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect, the district court did not explicitly
identify the Shickles factors referenced in Decorso.
However, it is evident that the district court relied
extensively on Decorso in making all three inquiries
required by rule 404(b). Moreover, we can find no
relevant Shickles factor that would lead us to believe
the district court abused its discretion in allowing the
State to introduce the fraudulent purchase evidence.
f 29 First, the need for the evidence was significant.
The fraudulent purchases were direct evidence of
Allen's participation in the conspiracy and corroborated
the testimony of Wright, a key witness for the State, that
Allen had paid Wrright to arrange for Jill's murder.
U 30 Second, the evidence that Allen had, in fact, stolen
personal client information and used it to make
fraudulent purchases was *737 strong. Police were
alerted to Allen's fraudulent activities only after Wright
indicated that Allen was disguising the payments used
to facilitate Jill's murder by using stolen credit cards to
purchase personal propertyfromthe Bombay Company,
JC Penney, Uintah Golf, and Pro Golf. Police
confirmed the veracity of this account after an
investigation revealed that someone had fraudulently
used the credit of two of Allen's clients at these specific
stores to purchase various items in the period leading
up to and following Jill's death. Moreover, Allen made
no attempt to refute this testimony and explicitly
stipulated to the introduction of evidence establishing
his fraudulent activities during trial.
Tf 31 Third, the fraudulent purchases were made
contemporaneously with the conspiracy. Although the
purchases do not correspond exactly with the payments
Allen made to Wright for Jill's murder,—the fraudulent
purchases, like the payments to Wright, occurred
leading up to and following the murder.

FN5. Allen argues that because the cash
payments and dates on which they were made
to Wright do not directly correspond "line by
line" to the dates upon and the amounts in
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which the fraudulent purchases were made, the
purchases provide no proof of Allen's role in
the conspiracy to commit the murder. We
disagree. The State did not need to establish
such an exacting correlat ion for a jury to
reasonably conclude that the fraudulent
purchases made before and after Jill's death
were connected to the payments Allen made to
Wright.
^ 32 Fourth, evidence of the fraudulent purchases was
needed to demonstrate that the money Wright received
for his participation in the conspiracy came from Allen,
not another source. It would have been difficult for the
State to have corroborated Wright's testimony and
established this link as effectively through alternative
methods of proof.
Tf 33 Finally, it is unlikely that Allen's involvement in
fraudulent activities would have roused the jury to
overmasteringhostility, especially in light of the gravity
of the offenses for which he was charged. Contrary to
Allen's assertions, we do not believe a juror who had
reasonable doubt of Allen's participation in Jill's murder
would nevertheless have been more likely to convict
Allen on such a weighty charge simply because he or
she desired to punish him for his prior, relatively minor
fraudulent acts.
134 In sum, because the evidence of Allen's fraudulent
purchases was admitted for a proper, noncharacter
purpose, was relevant, and had probative value that was
not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
the State to introduce the evidence during Allen's trial.

II. WRIGHT'S REFERENCE TO A LIE
DETECTOR TEST
rill 1f 35 We next address Allen's contention that the
district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a
mistrial after Wright made an improper comment during
the course of his testimony.
Tf 36 During the State's examination of Wright, the
following exchange took place:
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Q. What, if anything, did you and Paul discuss about
the nature of your telephone conversation after Jill's
death?
A. We just made it seem-we talked about what the
investigators were coming out to talk to me about,
things like that. Paul would reassure me that these
things were happening to all of his friends and don't
worry about it. You don't got nothing to worry about,
you haven't done anything. They're going to continue
to do this. Things like that. He had told me that they
had asked him to come in for a lie detector test.
(Emphasis added.)
Allen allowed the State's
examination to continue briefly followingthis statement
before requesting a bench conference and asking the
court for an opportunity to request a mistrial. Upon
conclusion of the State's direc t examination, Allen
moved for a mistrial, arguing that the State had
inappropriately and prejudicially elicited the lie
detector reference from Wright.
1f 37 The district court denied Allen's motion. Given
the context in which it was made, the court did not find
the lie detector reference to have been intentionally
elicited or planned.
Because Wright made the
statement*738 in passing and neither party attracted
attention to it, the court concluded that the statement
was "simply innocuous" and would not prejudice the
jury. The court did offer to give a curative instruction
regarding the comment, however, which Allen declined.
If 38 On appeal, Allen argues that Wright's reference to
a lie detector test "most likely caused the jury to
speculate about why the results of [Allen's] polygraph
examination were not placed into evidence or discussed
at trial," and that "[s]uch speculation logically led the
jury to conclude that he was trying to hide the negative
results of the lie detector test." He argues that this
reference prejudiced his right to a fair trial, and that as
a result the district court abused its discretion when it
denied Allen's request for a mistrial.— We disagree.

FN6. Allen also suggests that Wright's
statement was exacerbated by prosecutorial
misconduct. He asserts that the prosecutor
was aware of Wright's potential testimony but

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

108 P.3d730
108 P.3d 730, 519 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2005 UT 11
(Cite as: 108 P.3d 730)

nevertheless improperly allowed Wright to
make reference to the lie detector test, "which,
in turn, allowed the jury to abdicate its
all-important and difficult truth finding
function."
Because Allen has failed to
provide relevant authority supporting his
assertion that conduct such as this constitutes
prosecutorial misconduct warranting a new
trial, we decline to address the issue. See
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr.,
Inc.. 2003 UT 23, 1f 46, 70 P.3d 904
(declining to address an inadequately briefed
argument).
["121 If 39 Because a district judge is in an advantaged
position to determine the impact of courtroom events on
the total proceedings, once a district court has exercised
its discretion and denied a motion for a mistrial, we will
not reverse the court's decision unless it "is plainly
wrong in that the incident so likely influenced the jury
that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair
trial." State v. Wach 2001 UT 35,1145. 24 P.3d 948.
Applying this standard in this case, we cannot conclude
that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to
grant a mistrial.
T131 \ 40 A review of our case law amply reveals that
a mistrial is not required where an improper statement
is not intentionally elicited, is made in passing, and is
relatively innocuous in light of all the testimony
presented. For example, in State v. Butterfield, 2001
UT59. 27P.3d 1133, we held that a district court did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial
after a witness testified that he had obtained the
defendant's photograph from the Salt Lake County Jail.
Id. at % 47. We explained that the statement was not
intentionally elicited, was "vague" and "fleeting," and
the defendant could not point to evidence in the record
suggesting that the jury had relied on the witness's
statement. Id
1f 41 Similarly, in Wach, we held that a district court did
not abuse its discretion where it declined to grant a
mistrial after a witness violated the parties' previous
stipulation by introducing evidence of the defendant's
prior bad acts. 2001 UT 35 at HIT44-46. 24 P.3d 948.
We reasoned that the statement was "not elicited by the
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prosecutor," was an "isolated, off-hand remark, buried
in roughly 244 pages of testimony," and was "not
necessarily inflammatory." Id. at If 46.
K 42 Finally, in State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57.993 P.2d
837, we concluded that a district court's refusal to grant
a mistrial after a witness made improper references to
other crimes the defendant had committed was not an
abuse of discretion. Id. at \ 38. We explained that the
reference to other crimes was "vague" and "came only
after a lengthy direct examination and lengthy
cross-examination," and that the proceedings "move[d]
along without undue interruption and directed the jury's
attention to other matters." Id. at \ 39; see also State
v. Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879. 881, 883 (Utah 1988)
(holding a district court did not commit reversible error
by allowing a witness to improperly state that the
defendant possessed an outstanding warrant on another
offense because the statement was unintentionally
elicited, was "very brief and "only made in passing,"
provided no details of why the warrant was issued or to
which offense it was related, and the district court
admonished the jury to disregard the statement); State
v. Case, 547 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1976) (holding the
district court properly denied a defendant's motion for
a mistrial after a witness stated that the defendant had
been incarcerated in the Utah State Prison where the
statement was inadvertent, *739 not intentionally
elicited, and neither counsel nor court made further
reference to it).
\ 43 Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in declining to grant a mistrial for many of the reasons
articulated in the cases described above.
First,
Wright's reference to a lie detector test was not
intentionally elicited or planned. Second, the reference
was vague and mentioned only that Allen had been
asked to take a lie detector test-not that Allen had
actually taken or failed to pass such a test. Third, the
reference was brief and came only near the end of a
three-hour direct examination. Fourth, the proceedings
continued without undue interruption. Fifth, no further
attention was directed to either a lie detector test or
Wright's statement. Finally, the district court offered
to give the jury a curative instruction regarding the lie
detector reference, which Allen declined.
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If 44 Because we agree with the district court that
Wright's statement was innocuous, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
grant Allen's motion for a mistrial.

III. JUROR MISCONDUCT
f!41 K 45 We turn now to the final issue Allen raises on
appeal; namely, whether the district court abused its
discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial based on juror
misconduct.
1f 46 During the State's direct examination of Camille
Mauerhan, a State's witness, Mauerhan testified that
Allen had mentioned to her in a conversation prior to
his arrest that the police refused to speak with him
because he had retained an attorney. At the conclusion
of this testimony and in open court outside of the
presence of the jury, Allen moved for a mistrial,
arguing that Mauerhan's statement that Allen had
retained an attorney was prejudicial because it implied
that Allen was guilty and had something to hide.
Although the court ordered that the statement be
stricken from the record as unresponsive and directed
the jury to disregard it as such, the court declined to
grant the mistrial.
^ 47 After the jury returned a guilty verdict and Allen
was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole,
Allen filed a motion for a new trial, alleging juror
misconduct. Allen argued that one of the jurors had
learned through her spouse that defense counsel had
requested a mistrial based on Mauerhan's testimony,
and that the juror had subsequently relayed that
information to the other jurors.
K 48 In its ruling on Allen's motion, the district court
observed that "[i]t was inappropriate for any juror to
have found out about the motion for a mistrial and also
for any juror to have mentioned this to other members
of the jury." However, the court also found that
another juror had instructed the jury that they could not
discuss the issue of a mistrial and that the jury did not,
in fact, engage in any discussion regarding the mistrial
motion. Based on these facts, the court concluded that
Allen was not prejudiced because there was no

reasonable likelihood of a different verdict absent the
"somewhat innocuous" conduct of the juror.
Consequently, the district court denied Allen's motion
for a new trial.
If 49 Allen argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it declined to grant his motion for a
new trial. He contends that, instead of examining
whether he was prejudiced by the juror misconduct, the
district court should have applied the rebuttable
presumption of prejudice standard articulated by this
court in State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1985).
We disagree.
ri5iri61T[ 50 "When reviewing a [district] court's
denial of a motion for a new trial, we will not reverse
absent a clear abuse of discretion by the [district]
court." State v. Colwell 2000 UT 8. K 12, 994 P.2d
177 (internal quotations omitted). "At the same time,
however, we review the legal standards applied by the
[district] court in denying the motion for correctness."
State v. Martin. 2002 UT 34, If 45. 44 P.3d 805.
[171T18] f 51 Allen correctly observes that when "any
unauthorized contact during a trial between witnesses,
attorneys or court personnel and jurors... goes beyond
a mere incidental, unintended, and brief contact," there
is a rebuttable presumption of prejudice, and that to
counteract this presumption* 740 the prosecution must
prove that the unauthorized contact did not influence
the juror. Pike, 712 P.2d at 280 (emphasis added).
However, the State also correctly notes that this
rebuttable presumption only applies when the contact is
between a juror and other court participants, not jurors
and third parties unrelated to the proceedings.
Compare id. at 279-80 (applying a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice where the contact was
between a juror and a witness); State v. Erickson, 749
P.2d 620, 620-21 (Utah 1987) (same); State v.
Anderson. 65 Utah 415, 237 P. 941, 942-44 (1925)
(same); Lozan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224, 225-26
(Utah Ct.App. 1990) (applying a rebuttable presumption
of prejudice where the contact was between a juror and
the court bailiff), with Arellano v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 5
Utah 2d 146, 298 P.2d 527, 529-30 (1956) (explaining
that jurors are presumed to have conducted themselves
properly throughout the trial and illustrating that when
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an alleged contact occurs between a juror and a
non-court participant, the defendant must prove that the
misconduct prejudiced the defendant); State v. Tennev.
913P.2d750.756-58fUtahCt.App.1996) (holding that
no rebuttable presumption of prejudice attached where
a juror briefly discussed the case with a coworker
because "there was no impermissible contact between
a juror and a witness, party, or court personneP'-only
contact "between a juror and an outsider under
circumstances unrelated to the proceedings"); see also
State v. Cardall 1999 UT 51. IT 12. 21. 982 P.2d 79
(explaining that no presumption of prejudice arose
where a young witness and her mother embraced on the
witness stand at the conclusion of the witness's
testimony because no conversation occurred between
the witness and the jurors).
fl91 \ 52 In his reply brief, Allen concedes that the Pike
rebuttable presumption standard applies only when the
contact involves a juror and a court participant.
However, he argues that the contact in this case was, for
all intents and purposes, between a juror and other court
participants-namely, the juror who obtained the outside
information, Allen's defense counsel, and Mauerhan,
the State's witness. He asserts that, "[although press
reports and spouses were the mediums through which
the information traveled, the contact substantially
amounted to improper contact between the juror, a
witness, and counsel." This argument is without merit.
\ 53 Mauerhan and Allen's defense counsel were
obviously directly involved in the events that ultimately
caused the press to report on Allen's request for a
mistrial.
However, it is clear that the only
unauthorized "contact" that occurred in this case was
between a juror and her spouse.
Because the
misconduct did not involve contact between a juror and
court personnel, the district court applied the correct
legal standard. Therefore, we need only determine
whether the court abused its discretion in denying
Allen's motion for a new trial.
\ 54 We conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion. The juror's comment was apparently
brief and contained no substantive information
concerning the mistrial motion. Additionally, the jury
did not, in fact, discuss Allen's motion for a mistrial.
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The district court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that, under these circumstances, Allen was
not prejudiced by the inappropriate juror contact.

CONCLUSION
\ 55 We reject Allen's assertion that any error occurred
during the course of his trial that warrants a reversal of
his conviction. First, the district court did not abuse its
discretion under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) by
allowing the State to introduce evidence showing that
Allen had used stolen client information to fraudulently
obtain credit and purchase various items of personal
property both before and after Jill's murder. Because
the evidence was direct evidence of the conspiracy and
illustrated Allen's preparation, plan, knowledge, and
intent, it was admitted for a proper, noncharacter
purpose. Additionally, the evidence was relevant, and
the court acted within its discretion in concluding that
the probative value of the evidence was not
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
Tf 56 Second, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial after Wright
testified that Allen had *741 been asked to take a lie
detector test.
The improper reference was not
intentionally elicited or planned, was vague in its
substance, and came only near the end of a lengthy
direct examination. Moreover, following the reference,
the proceedings continued without undue interruption,
no further attention was directed to either a lie detector
test or Wright's statement, and the court offered to give
a curative instruction to the jury, which Allen declined.
Tf 57 Finally, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to grant a new trial after
discovering that a juror had improperly learned through
her spouse about a defense mistrial motion. Because
the unauthorized contact was between a juror and a
person unconnected to the proceedings, the district
court correctly evaluated Allen's new trial motion in
terms of whether Allen had been prejudiced by the
misconduct. Further, because the improperly obtained
information contained nothing substantive about the
mistrial motion and the jury did not consider the
information when making its decision, the district court
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acted within its discretion in determining that a new
trial was not warranted. Affirmed.
f 58 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice
WILKINS. Justice PARRISH. and Justice NEHRING
concur in Justice DURRANT's opinion.
Utah,2005.
State v. Allen
108 P.3d 730, 519 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2005 UT 11
END OF DOCUMENT
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Addendum 3

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OP DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
PAUL CHRISTOPHER ALLEN,
Petitioner,
vs.

ORDER REQUIRING RESPONSIVE
PLEADING FROM THE STATE OF
UTAH
Case No. 050801275

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

Judge Glen R. Dawson

On October 18, 2005, Petitioner in the above-entitled case
filed a Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act
and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Although

Petitioner raises five numbered claims, the court's review of the
petition suggests that several unnumbered claims have also been
raised.

For the sake of clarity, the court has renumbered all of

the claims raised in the petition as follows:
Claim 1: Judicial bias;
Claim 2: Prosecution's use of false testimony during trial;
Claim 3: Jurors were not fair and impartial;
Claim 4: Trial court's refusal to give Petitioner's proffered
jury instructions;
Claim 5: Erroneous jury instructions and special verdict form;
Claim 6: Error in trying Petitioner for multiple offenses;
Claim 7: The Utah Supreme Court's decision on Petitioner's
direct appeal was result-driven and erroneous;
Claim 8: Error by the trial court resulting in a trial that

I I I ! i l l ! 3 i U ™ S«??J?,?±L Ve P ^ i n g from the State ol
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was fundamentally unfair;
Claim 9: Error by the trial court in denying Petitioner's
motion for a new trial;
Claim 10: Ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and
Claim 11: Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
Pursuant

to Rule

65C(g) (1) , the

petition and all attached documents.

court

has

reviewed

the

Based upon this initial

review, the court has found that claim 7 is frivolous on its face
because Petitioner is not entitled to the relief he seeks as a
matter of law.

See Utah Code Ann. 78-3-4(5) (district court only

has appellate jurisdiction to review judgments from justice courts
and small claims).

Furthermore, the court has also found that

claim 9 has been previously adjudicated.

See State v. Allen, 2005

UT 11, 149, 108 P. 3d 730 (trial court did not cibuse its discretion
in denying motion for new trial).

In light of these findings, the

court has ordered the summary dismissal of claim 7 and claim 9.
All

proceedings

on

these

two

claims

have,

therefore,

been

terminated. Petitioner, however, is permitted to proceed on claims
1-6, 8, and 10-11.
Pursuant to Rule 65C(h), the court has directed the clerk of
the court

to mail

a copy

of the petition, attachments, and

memorandum to Respondent.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent answer or otherwise
respond to claims 1-6, 8, and 10-11 raised in the petition within

2

thirty (30) days from the date of this Order.

See Utah R. Civ. P.

65C(i) .
DATED this

"1

day of November, 2005.

BY THE COURT:

M^^mBti

Judge Glen R. D a W J b n ^ ^ V - J \
Second Judicial District-Court
\ &
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Addendum 4

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAUL C. ALLEN,

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Petitioner,

vs.

Case No. 050801275

CLINT FRIEL, STATE OF UTAH, et al.
Judge Glen R. Dawson

Respondent.

On January 24, 2007, the Court heard arguments on all pending motions, including
the State's motion to dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief and petitioner's
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Assistant Utah Attorney General Brett J. DelPorto
appeared on behalf of the State. Petitioner Paul C. Allen appeared pro se. Scott Daniels,
who was appointed to represent petitioner, but later withdrew, sat at counsel table with
petitioner to act in an advisory capacity. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took
the matter under advisement and scheduled a telephone conference for February 9, 2007,
to announce its decision.
CONCLUSIONS
1.

The State's motion to dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief is well-

taken and must be granted.

050801275

VD19512917
FRIEL,CLINT

2.

The petitioner is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings and that motion

must be denied.
3.

Almost all of petitioner's claims are procedurally barred. In his petition,

petitioner alleged prosecutorial misconduct, juror misconduct, improper jury instruction,
merger, structural error and ineffective assistance of counsel. All of these claims, with
the exception of claims of ineffective assistance against petitioner's appellate attorneys,
are barred because petitioner is not entitled to relief on any ground that was raised or
addressed at trial or on appeal, or that could have been but was not raised at trial or on
appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 73-35a-106(b) & (c) (West 2004).
4.

Petitioner also challenged the trial court's denial of the jurors' request that

testimony of prosecution witnesses be provided to them during their deliberations. Upon
receipt of the jurors' request, the court conferenced with counsel for the State and the
defendant. All agreed that the testimony should not be provided. This accords with the
rules of criminal procedure and was therefore appropriate. See Utah R. Crim. P. 17(m).
Accordingly, petitioner's challenge to that ruling is without merit.
5.

Although not procedurally barred, petitioner's ineffective assistance of

counsel claims against his appellate attorneys fail nonetheless. Under the PostConviction Remedies Act, "[t]he petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a
preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief." Utah
Code Ann. § 78-35a-105 (West 2004). To prevail, petitioner must demonstrate, first, that
counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of

-2-

reasonableness and, second, that petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's errors.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Petitioner is also required to plead his
claims with sufficient specificity to allow the court to determine their validity. See State
v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998) ("'[Pjroof of ineffective assistance of
counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality'") (citing
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)). Petitioner's claims are too vague
and speculative to meet his burden under either the first or second Stricklandprong.
Accordingly, petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail and must be
dismissed.
6.

The affidavit from one of the jurors in petitioner's criminal trial, which was

submitted in support of petitioner's claims for relief, must be stricken. Because the juror
affidavit purports to testify to matters concerning jury deliberations, it violates rule
606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which prohibits a juror's testimony, by affidavit or
otherwise, concerning jury deliberations.
7.

The Court notes that both the State and petitioner have referenced a sealed

transcript of a conference between petitioner and his trial counsel, Ron Yengich, which
was held some time during or immediately after the petitioner's trial in February 2000.
The conference was reportedly held to discuss possible claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel that could be raised by petitioner following his conviction. The Court has not
reviewed the transcript, but will unseal it if either party wishes to review it and files an
appropriate motion.

-3-

ORDER
Based on the motions, memoranda and other pleadings filed by both parties, and
based on the arguments of counsel and petitioner, and because there is good cause for
doing so,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The State's motion to dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief is

GRANTED. The petition's claims are DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and
the Court DENIES post-conviction relief on all claims.
2.

The petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED.

3.

The State's motion to strike the juror affidavit is GRANTED.

Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, "[a]ny party may appeal from the trial
court's final judgment on a petition for post-conviction relief to the appellate court
having jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-110 (West 2004).
DATED this [H

day offiebsjafy,2007.
BY THE COURT:

^~^Jkj^5L
Judge Glen R. Dawson
Second Judicial District C(
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Addendum 5

List of Petitioner's Claims on Post-Conviction Review and on Appeal:
The following list sets out the page of the petition, with its record number in parenthesis,
followed by the corresponding page of appellant's brief:
(1) Judicial Bias — 15-19 (R43-47, 50-53, 73-78); 4-8, 11-14, 34-39.
(2) Prosecution's use of false testimony during trial — 20-22, 25-30 (R48-50, 53-58); 911,14-19.
(3) Jurors were not fair and impartial — 30, 51-52 (R58, 79-80); 19, 40-41.
(4) Trial court's refusal to give petitioner's proffered jury instructions — 31, 53 (R 59,
81); 20, 42.
(5) Erroneous jury instructions and special verdict form — 32-33, 36, 53 (R60-61, 64,
81); 21-22, 25, 42.
(6) Error in trying Petitioner for multiple offenses — 34-35, 37-41 (R62-63, 65-69); 2324, 26-30.
(7) The Utah Supreme Court's decision on petitioner's direct appeal was result-driven and
erroneous —41-45 (R69-73); 30-34.
(8) Error by the trial court resulting in a trial that was fundamentally unfair— 50-55
(R78-83); 39-44.
(9) Error by the trial court in denying Petitioner's motion for a new trial — 50 (R78); 39.
(10) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel — 54-55 (R82-83); 43-44.
(11) Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel — 54-55 (R82-83); 43-44.

Addendum 6

Affidavit
State of Utah

)

County of Davis

)

1. I, Trenton David was a juror in the Paul C. Allen murder trial in February 2000.
2. We the jury sent a note to Judge Dawson, requesting trial testimony of state witness,
George Taylor that was in conflict and facts needed to be confirmed which were in
dispute between jurors in this capital offense case.
3. This information was thought to be recorded of the trial and accessible to jurors in the
fact finding and decision making process of jury deliberation.
4. This information we (jurors) were seeking would have changed my verdict of guilt /
innocence of the three week trial.
5. The judge instructed us that we could not use notes of other jurors and that are notes
were not evidence.
6. Unfortunately, Judge Dawson denied allowing trial testimony to jurors during
deliberation.
7. As of being contacted by Gary Potter - Investigator, after trial's end regarding another
issue (Jury Misconduct), the trial testimony refused by Judge was brought up with
Gary Potter.
8. At that time, Potter acknowledged that Taylor had stated the gun was purchased in or
about April of 1996.
9. This testimony would have proved Taylor was fabricating his testimony for self gain
verses that of Toby White, who, testified selling gun to Taylor in " Late "93 or early
"94".

10. I told Potter that if Judge Dawson would have allowed George Taylor's testimony, it
was very likely that I would have found Paul Allen innocent of all charges.
11. I witnessed jurors disregarding instructions from the court not to expose one self to
Media, and to not discuss case with other jury members during the trial. The jury was
allowed to discuss the trial among jury members during the deliberation only.
12. I felt other jurors had bias opinions before trial began,fromexposurefromthe media.

Dated This £& ^

Day of

<L)ov\

2005

Trenton David
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

<?72&> Day of N\Vsi»£. TTZCXfT*
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